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I. QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the Utah Court of Appeals err in concluding that the 
zoning ordinance of Clearfield City was invalid and had been 
unconstitutionally applied by holding that the ordinance requires, 
in cases involving zoning conditional use permits, an initial 
determination by the Clearfield City Planning Commission with an 
appeal to the Clearfield City Council rather than to the Clearfield 
City Board of Adjustment? 
2. Does equity and justice require that this Court grant the 
Petition in this case until at least such time as it has considered 
the requests for rehearing in a case primarily relied upon by the 
Court of Appeals? 
3. Did the Court of Appeals err in failing to address the 
contention of Petitioner that it had legitimately denied a 
conditional use permit to the Respondent on the basis that 
governmental planning allowed the separation of mental health 
facilities rather than clustering them in one location? 
II. REFERENCE TO OPINION 
The opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals is presently 
contained in 82 Utah Adv. Rptr. 38 (May 13, 1988). 
III. JURISDICTION REQUIREMENTS 
1. The decision by the Court of Appeals was filed on May 13, 
1988. 
2. An extension of time to file this Petition for Certiorari 
was granted by a justice of this Court on June 13, 1988 allowing 
this Petition to be filed on or before July 12, 1988. 
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3. Section 78-2-2 authorizes review by this Court of 
judgments of the Court of Appeals; Rule 42 of the Rules of the Utah 
Supreme Court provide that the review of a judgment of the Court of 
Appeals shall be initiated by a Petition for a Writ of Certiorari 
to the Supreme Court of Utah. 
IV. CONTROLLING STATUTES AND ORDINANCES 
Various sections of Title 10, Chapter 9, Article 1 and Article 
2 of the Utah Code Annotated are applicable to this Petition. A 
copy of Chapter 9, Article 1 and Article 2 are contained in the 
Appendix to this Petition. In addition, Chapter 2 and Chapter 12 
of the Clearfield City Ordinances as of July of 1984 are also 
contained in the Appendix attached herein. 
V. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
On June 25, 1984 Respondent Davis County made application with 
Petitioner Clearfield City for a conditional use permit to operate 
a "Residential Treatment Program for Adolescents and Adults 
Experiencing Substance Abuse and Mental Illness." A hearing was 
held on July 18, 1984 before the Clearfield City Planning 
Commission. The Commission in a three-to-one vote denied the 
application. Subsequently, in accordance with the Clearfield City 
Ordinance then in effect, Respondent appealed to the Clearfield 
City Council. 
A public meeting was held on September 11, 1984 and was then 
continued until October 9, 1984. The City Council voted to uphold 
the decision of the Planning Commission to deny the conditional use 
permit. 
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Suit was commenced in the District Court of Davis County on 
November 7, 1984 alleging that the actions of the Clearfield City 
Council and its Planning Commission were both unconstitutional and 
arbitrary and capricious. 
The matter was tried to the Honorable Douglas L. Cornaby on 
April 24 and April 25 of 1986. The District Court issued a 
Memorandum Decision on May 28, 1986 ruling in favor of the 
plaintiff and ordering that a Writ of Mandamus be issued requiring 
Clearfield City to issue a conditional use permit. Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law were signed on May 28, 1986. 
Thereafter, Petitioner's request for a stay of execution was denied 
and Petitioner Clearfield City subsequently filed a Notice of 
Appeal on July 23, 1986. 
The appeal was originally docketed in this Court (No. 
86-0343). Later, however, this Court ordered the case poured-over 
to the newly created Utah Court of Appeals (No. 860343-CA). 
The parties orally argued this matter before a three-judge 
panel of the Court of Appeals and on May 13, 1988 a decision of the 
Court of Appeals was rendered affirming the decision of the lower 
court. It is from this decision that the present Petition for 
Certiorari is taken. 
B. Statement of Facts 
In the opening brief of Petitioner a 19-page Statement of 
Facts was presented to the Court of Appeals. Since the majority of 
this material goes to the merits of the decision made by the 
petitioner it can be briefly restated for purposes of this 
Petition. It should be observed, however, that there were two 
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forums in which the lower court record was established. First, 
extensive verbatim recordings of the proceedings in the Planning 
Commission and City Council were entered as evidence. Second, the 
lower court took additional testimony of witnesses in a hearing in 
which numerous witnesses were called upon to testify. 
In 1981 Davis County through its Executive Director of the 
Davis County Mental Health Department applied for a conditional use 
permit to allow the construction of a facility known as the 
Addiction Recovery Center (ADC). At this time the Director 
represented to the Planning Commission that he had no reason nor 
any intention to request any other similar facilities in the same 
area (Lower Court Transcript 323; hereinafter Tr.). 
The ARC was constructed in 1981 and presently treats adults 
who are experiencing or recovering from chemical addiction. (Tr. 
72). At the time relevant to this appeal the area in which the ARC 
facility is located was zoned PO which stands for a Professional 
Office Zone. (Tr. 137, 101-102). In the summer of 1984 the 
respondent made an application for a new facility which was 
proposed to be located next to the existing facility. This new 
proposed facility was to be used "as a residential treatment 
program for adolescents and adults experiencing substance abuse and 
mental illness." (Plaintiff's Exhibit 1). The existing Clearfield 
City Ordinances at the time (Chapter 12) did not allow this type of 
use as a "permitted use" but did allow a convalescent service to be 
occupied in the zone if a "conditional use permit" had been 
approved by the Planning Commission. (11-12-1 through 11-12-5 
Clearfield City Ordinances). 
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On July 18, 1984 a hearing was held before the Clearfield City 
Planning Commission, At that time various proponents and opponents 
of the facility testified before the Commission. The Executive 
Director of Davis County Mental Health extensively discussed the 
need for the facility and how it would impact upon the area as well 
as contribute to the general well being of the community. (Tr. 
22). Many of the people in attendance at the meeting stated their 
opposition to the new facility on the basis that they did not want 
a second facility located next to the first one, that they were 
fearful about dangers of the type of people located in the 
facility, as well as several other concerns. 
Wilford Summerkorn testified that he was employed by Davis 
County but was also the Clearfield City Planner under a contract 
arrangement between the County and the City. (Tr. 98-99) . He had 
prepared a report for the Planning Commission after investigating 
the application of the County. A portion of that report stated the 
following: 
A question that has been raised by some is the 
appropriateness of having two such facilities located so 
close together. Land uses of this type are often viewed 
as being somewhat undesirable for a variety of reasons, 
most of them personal reasons of homeowners in their 
vicinity. Undesirable land uses can be located in 
communities in one of two ways: they can be grouped 
together to minimize the impact on other areas of the 
community, though they may then more severely impact the 
area they are located in, or they may be spread 
throughout the city to lessen the impact in any one 
location and "share the wealth" so to speak. 
The only guide or precedence that Clearfield may 
have as to what policy to follow would be the regulation 
for residential facilities for the handicapped. 
Handicap facilities and mental health facilities are far 
from identical, but some of the impacts may be similar. 
Clearfield's regulations for the handicap facilities 
require that no two facilities be located closer than 
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one mile from each other. This, then, tends to follow 
the idea of disbursing such facilities throughout the 
community rather than concentrating them. (Plaintiff's 
Exhibit 17). 
At the conclusion of the meeting a vote was taken with three 
members voting to deny the permit and one member voting in favor of 
it. (Tr. 303-07). 
After the meeting the Davis County Mental Health Department 
requested the City to specifically list why the Zoning Commission 
had denied the conditional use application. No response was 
received from the Zoning Commission (Tr. 34-35). There was no 
statutory requirement that such response be made. 
Subsequently, on September 11, 1984 a meeting was held before 
the City Council to appeal the denial of the permit by the Planning 
and Zoning Commission. Much of the same discussion that had 
previously occurred was repeated in the City Council meeting. In 
one instance, however, Shirley Reed, a councilwoman for Clearfield 
City who had previously attended the Planning Commission hearing 
and who had performed additional independent research as to the 
question of locating two facilities adjacent or apart, spoke 
concerning a report from the American Planning Association entitled 
"The Effect of Group Care Facilities on Property Values." 
(Plaintiffs Exhibit 10; Plaintiffs Exhibit 18; Tr. 163). She 
stated in her opinion that these studies showed that concentrated 
density of group homes had an impact on the characterization of 
property and their value and that it was generally recommended that 
city planners look at disbursing the facilities rather than putting 
them in a cluster area. While there were six studies contained in 
the report, Mrs. Reed focused upon one particular study done in 
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Oakland, California in 1983 which involved the type of group home 
nearly identical to that proposed by Davis County namely persons 
with mental health problems, alcohol problems and drug problems. 
This study, according to the report, showed that grouping these 
type of facilities together had an adverse effect upon the 
surrounding area as well as causing a marked decline in property 
values. 
Don W. Baird, the City Manager of Clearfield, with a master's 
degree in public administration told the Council that in his 
opinion the decision could go either way since valid arguments 
could be presented as to both positions. (Tr. 223). 
At the conclusion of the meeting it was decided to table the 
resolution and to continue it to a further meeting. Mr. Baird was 
directed by the Council to make a study of the area as to other 
social services being provided in Clearfield City as well as to 
gather more information about the proposed Davis County facility. 
(Tr. 204, 329). 
Between September 11 and October 9 Mr. Baird conducted various 
studies and made various inquiries concerning the location of this 
facility. On October 9, 1984 the City Council met as they 
customarily did one hour prior to the beginning of the public 
hearing. At that time Mr. Baird briefly showed the Council some of 
the exhibits he had prepared. There was no discussion as to how 
any member felt about the facility in light of this information. 
(Tr. 345). 
Shortly thereafter the public portion of the meeting began at 
which time various members again spoke concerning the location of 
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the facility. Councilwoman Reed again stated her concern about the 
placement of the facility next to the adjoining facility and said 
that she believed Clearfield had been responsive to the community's 
and the county's special needs by the establishment of numerous 
facilities. During the meeting as contained in a verbatim 
transcript Councilwoman Reed stated: 
As an elected official I feel that it is my 
responsibility in upholding the master plan and of those 
planning ordinances, just as I would carefully consider 
say three Artie Circles being in the very same area. 
This would not be good to the original businesses. And 
I feel that from my charter that an elected official is 
to minimize the impact of the changes to the 
characteristics of that particular neighborhood and I 
feel that another residential group care facility at 
this particular location at 904 South State Street would 
actually maximize the impact rather than minimize it. 
(Plaintiff's Exhibit 13, p. 3). 
Another councilman stated a similar concern. He said: 
I am against two of them being right together and 
taking up 11% of the ground. I am against that and I 
don't think that we, and I don't know how you feel, that 
we should be stimied with or have that put on us that we 
are against that type of facility and I think it needs 
to be done and should be done but I don't think there 
should be two of them together. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 
13, p. 10). 
A vote was subsequently taken at which time the Council voted 
to uphold the decision of the Planning Commission and to deny the 
conditional use permit. The minutes of the meeting reflect three 
reasons why the permit was denied. First, that Clearfield City had 
been responsive to the needs of these types of persons by 
supporting four other facilities in the community all within less 
than a one-mile radius; second, even the most favorable studies of 
group care facilities indicated that facilities should be disbursed 
to lessen the impact to property owners and since a staff survey 
-8-
indicated 11% of the survey area would be dedicated to group care 
facilities this would result in too high of a density for this 
particular location and; third, as elected officials it was the 
responsibility of the Council to insure the characteristics of the 
neighborhood was minimized and that this new facility would 
maximize the impact on the existing homes, churches and schools. 
(Plaintiff's Exhibit 11, p. 2). 
After the vote the Council instructed Mr, Baird to find 
alternative sites for this type of facility (Tr. 287) . Later Mr. 
Baird gave to the Davis County Health Administrator a map showing 
three possible sites in which such a facility would be approved. 
(Tr. 249-51). These proposed sites included areas in a residential 
zone since a new zoning ordinance which had just gone into effect 
permitted these type of facilities as a conditional use in any 
residential zone within the city. (Tr. 247-49). 
Later, two of these three sites were approved by the City for 
other facilities not owned by Davis County Mental Health but which 
supported similar types of programs. (Tr. 251-52). 
After listening to the testimony of the witnesses and 
reviewing the verbatim transcripts of what occurred during the 
various meetings the lower court judge granted the County's request 
for a Writ of Mandamus essentially finding that there was no valid 
reason for denying the application to permit this facility in the 
proposed location. A copy of the Memorandum Decision of the lower 
court together with its Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law is 
attached hereto to the Appendix. The court not only found the 
decision of the City to be arbitrary and capricious but also found 
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it to have unconstitutionally applied Section 11 of Chapter 12 of 
the Clearfield Zoning Ordinance in violation of Section 7 and 
Section 24 of Article I of the Utah Constitution and of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, 
The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower 
court concluding that there was no evidence to support the City's 
decision and that "public clamor" had improperly influenced the 
City in denying the permit. A copy of the Court of Appeals 
decision is contained in the Appendix herein and will be 
extensively discussed in the next section of this Petition* 
VI. ARGUMENT FOR THE ISSUANCE OF WRIT 
A litigant in a court of law is painfully aware that a 
decision may be rendered against him regardless of his own beliefs 
as to justice and equity. Lawyers routinely instruct their clients 
that an appellate court may well find against the client on factual 
matters or on legal arguments presented. Litigants and lawyers are 
both prepared for adversity in this regard. However, fundamental 
justice and procedure require that the parties be given an 
opportunity to effectively argue issues which are deemed by the 
court to be controlling. In addition, those central issues 
disputed by the parties should be addressed by the court in order 
that a resolution of the issue may be made. 
In the instant case the Court of Appeals failed in both of 
these respects. First, the court on its own motion wrote an 
opinion based upon the alleged infirmity of the Clearfield City 
Ordinances and upon the standards of judicial review. If the 
briefs in this case are examined by this Court it is obvious that 
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neither the statutory appeal structure nor the applicable standard 
of judicial review was discussed by either party except in passing. 
It was not until oral argument that these highly important 
questions were raised by questions from the bench. 
Second, the Court of Appeals failed to address the issue which 
was central to the arguments contained in the briefs namely whether 
the decision of the City to prohibit two facilities together was 
arbitrary and capricious or unconstitutional. The Court of Appeals 
in its opinion has cited numerous reasons claimed by the City to 
justify the denial of the permit except the primary reason of 
adjacent properties: the main and critical issue raised by the 
parties below. 
Thus, the Court of Appeals in its opinion not only established 
extremely critical law with no input from the parties but also 
completely ignored the arguments which were the center of the 
appeal. Since the issues addressed by the court on its own 
initiative are extremely important to cities and municipalities 
throughout Utah these "additions" have far more impact upon 
Clearfield City and other cities than simply whether a mental 
health facility should be allowed. Thus, not only are there 
meritorious reasons for this Court to review the decision of the 
Court of Appeals based upon the substance of the arguments but 
there is also reason for review because of the procedural infirmity 
below. 
A. A Writ of Certiorari Should be Granted 
By This Court Since the Decision of the 
Court of Appeals Has Decided an Important 
Question of Municipal Law Which Has Not Been, 
But Should be, Settled by This Court and 
Which Substantially Affects All Municipalities 
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and Cities in Utah, 
The decision of the Court of Appeals substantially affects 
nearly all small cities and municipalities in Utah* As noted in a 
bulletin of the Utah Chapter of the American Planning Association, 
an organization of city and county administrators: "With a quick 
one-two punch, the state's top courts last month demolished the 
appeals process used by many Utah cities in administration of their 
zoning ordinances." A copy of the Utah APA planner is contained 
herein in the Appendix. 
Essentially, the decision of the Court of Appeals has held 
that in cases involving conditional use permits it is required that 
any aggrieved litigant from the Planning and Zoning Commission must 
appeal such decision to the Board of Adjustment. While this Court 
has recently decided a case involving historic permits it has yet 
to decide any case involving a conditional use permit. 
All cities and municipalities now contain provisions in their 
codes allowing certain uses of property which are not deemed 
"permitted" as a matter of right but which can be allowed if 
certain conditions are met. 
The Court of Appeals as well as this Court in the past has 
failed to distinguish the various types of zoning cases that arise 
in municipalities. For example, there can be little doubt that the 
legislative body of a city is empowered under Utah statutes to 
establish various zones of use. If a person believes that a zone 
should be upgraded or downgraded then that person must apply to the 
appropriate zoning commission and legislative body for amendment or 
change to such zone. The decision of the legislative body will be 
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upheld as long as the zoning provisions are not conficatory, 
discriminatory, or arbitrary. Dowse v. Salt Lake City Corp., 
255 P.2d 723 (Utah 1953); Phi Cappa Iota Fraternity v. Salt 
Lake City, 212 P.2d 177 (Utah 1949). 
In other instances, persons seek to receive a "variance" which 
allows them to build a building, for example, on a lot smaller than 
required by the zoning ordinances or to have a sidewalk which is 
narrower than required by the ordinances. The Legislature has 
provided that the Board of Adjustment is the correct avenue for 
appeal of an administrator's decision denying such variance. In 
those cases the legislative body of a city is not involved. 
Thus, the Court of Appeals in interpreting Title 10 of the 
Utah Code Annotated Chapter 9 concluded that because Section 
10-9-15 provides judicial appeal from an adverse decision of a 
Board of Adjustment that ipso facto all decisions made in zoning 
matters must be ultimately heard by the Board of Adjustment. 
Such a conclusion is absurd since the Board of Adjustment is a 
creature created by the legislative body of a city and under the 
Court of Appeal's interpretation it, not the legislative body of a 
city, would be the final arbitrator of every type of zoning dispute 
whether it be over a backyard variance or the permissible uses in a 
master plan. 
The premise for conditional uses is that certain uses can be 
made appropriate for inclusion with other permitted uses specified 
within a zoning district if certain mitigating, buffering, spacing, 
or site development requirements are in place at a particular site 
or property. As to each application a zoning "establishment" 
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decision is made as to the relative use of a specific property 
within the district. This is a legislative function of the 
legislative body with recommendation from its own planning 
commission. It is not an executive function of the zoning 
administrator or a decision by a zoning official for interpretation 
of zoning requirements. 
The decision of the Court of Appeals requiring conditional use 
permits to be ultimately decided by a Board of Adjustment is both 
contrary to the state statutory scheme and inherently impractical 
since in many instances members of the zoning commission serve as 
members of the Board of Adjustment. As noted in the dissenting 
opinion in Scherbel v. Salt Lake City Corp., 81 Utah Adv. Rptr. 
15 (May 3f 1988) such common membership automatically creates the 
appearance of a biased appeal. 
Since this decision impacts almost every city in Utah which 
uses conditional use permits, it is essential that a decision of 
this import be made by the state's highest court after a full 
briefing on the merits by both parties. 
B. In the Event This Court Reverses Its 
Decision of Prior Zoning Cases Relied 
Upon by the Court of Appeals, Then the 
Decision of the Court of Appeals Must be 
Vacated. 
The Court of Appeals placed great emphasis upon this Court's 
two previous decisions of Chambers v. Smithfield City, 714 P.2d 
1133 (Utah 1986) and Scherbel v. Salt Lake City Corp., 81 Utah Adv. 
Rptr. 15 (May 3, 1988). It is the understanding of Petitioner 
that the Scherbel case has now been taken under advisement for 
rehearing. Because this case contains the same flawed application 
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of the Utah zoning statutes, it is essential that the position 
taken by the dissent be adopted by this Court and that zoning 
matters be separated from matters involving administration of 
zoning regulations. 
If this Petition for Certiorari is denied then Petitioner will 
be required to adhere to the decision of the Court of Appeals even 
if this Court subsequently reverses those cases upon which the 
Court of Appeals relied• 
It is therefore respectfully submitted that in any event this 
Court should grant the present Petition even if for the sole 
purpose of awaiting any reversal of the Scherbel case so that such 
matter may be remanded to the Court of Appeals in light of any 
reversal. Such procedure would protect the interests of Petitioner 
pending any new decision by this Court of the critical Scherbel 
decision relied upon by the Court of Appeals. 
C. This Court Should Grant a Petition of 
Certiorari in Order to Review the Question 
Omitted by the Court of Appeals as to 
Whether a City is Entitled to Deny a 
Conditional Use Permit Because of its 
Desire to Disburse Such Uses Rather Than 
Cluster Them. 
The Court of Appeals as noted in the previous fact statement 
completely ignored the contention of Petitioner that its decision 
to deny the conditional use permit to the County was primarily 
based upon a legitimate and proper reason, namely that the City did 
not wish to locate two of these types of facilities next to each 
other. The Court of Appeals listed and rejected every other reason 
discussed during the public hearings but patently avoided the 
question raised by Petitioner that the avoidance of clustering was 
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a legitimate city concern. 
Since this concept is utilized by city planners throughout the 
State of Utah it is essential that this Court pass upon the 
validity of such reasoning in the granting or denying of 
conditional use permits. Even if it is assumed that the Board of 
Adjustment should be the ultimate appellate authority within a city 
administration, this body of officials still needs to understand 
whether the decision of the lower court that such reasoning is 
arbitrary and capricious is in fact correct. 
While admittedly the impact of the decision relating to the 
issue of "clustering" vs. "disbursing" is far less than the impact 
relating to the appellate process, it nevertheless is important to 
other cities and counties who utilize similar ordinances in their 
planning and who have constant applications for similar uses within 
a given conditional use zone. 
In addition, of course, it is only fundamentally fair that the 
Petitioner in this case be given a judicial decision as to the 
arguments advanced by it for justifying its actions and that to 
completely ignore, as did the Court of Appeals, this fundamental 
reason for rejection casts serious aspersions upon the judicial 
system. 
CONCLUSION 
The decision of the Court of Appeals in this case has 
seriously disrupted the procedures of cities, counties, and 
municipalities in matters which have been established for literally 
decades. The decision is not only contrary to the intention of the 
Legislature but is also contrary to the spirit and intent of zoning 
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laws and procedures. It is proper that the legislative body of a 
city be the final arbitrator in questions relating to use of land 
and such decision should not be delegated to a body subservient to 
that body. This extremely important issue was never raised below 
nor briefed by either party. 
The questionable decisions of this Court in closely related 
zoning matters and the pending nature of these cases requires, in 
the interest of justice that this case, at a mininum, be suspended 
until such time as any new decision is forthcoming from this Court. 
In such event, the case could be remanded to the Court of Appeals 
to decide in light of any new amended decision by this Court. 
Finally, the failure of the Court of Appeals to address the 
central issue in this case relating to disbursing or clustering 
these type of facilities is not only an egregious violation of 
judicial procedure, but also denies other cities and planners the 
opportunity to examine the validity of this argument as it relates 
to their own problems of conditional uses. 
For these reasons, therefore, it is respectfully submitted 
that this Court grant the Petition for Certiorari requested by 
Clearfield City. 
DATED this 12th day of July, 1988. 
Craig 3(.Jc6ok 
Attorney for Petitioner 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Court of Appeals 
-17-
for the State of Utah to Gerald E. Hess, Assistant Davis County 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
We agree that Woodward, by its conduct, 
waived its right to incentive commissions 
under the sales agreement with Collins. The 
evidence is uncontroverted that Woodward 
was aware of the existence of its right to 
receive compensation pursuant to paragraph 
3(b) and that it knew such a claim had to be 
documented by a daily sales report and sub-
mitted monthly. Nonetheless, Woodward 
decided to "roll over and play dead" as it was 
"more than willing to settle, for $45,000 a 
year." it was not until after the relationship 
was terminated that Woodward sought what it 
knew it was entitled to receive during the 
entire course of its employment. Such 
conduct, notwithstanding whatever unexpre-
ssed subjective intent Woodward's principal 
had, unequivocally evinced an intent to waive 
its right to claim the incentive commissions.3 
Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's 
decision granting Collins* motion for 
summary judgment. 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Norman H. Jackson, Judge 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
1. See. e.g.. In Re Schulte Retail Stores Corp., 22 F. 
Supp. 612, 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1937). In the instant case, 
the material facts relative to waiver are undisputed 
and, accordingly, the trial court's conclusion that 
those facts show that Woodward waived its claim is 
reviewable as a question of law. See Diversified 
Equities. Inc. v. American Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 739 
P.2d 1133, 1136 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) ("Where the 
facts are not in material dispute, interpretation 
placed thereon by trial court becomes a question of 
law.. . /) . 
2. Of course, it is Collins* position that no such 
commissions were owed under the contract. A 
timely assertion by Woodward would have permitted 
the parties an opportunity to address the contractual 
ambiguity and adjust the terms to comport with 
their negotiations and actual understandings. As to 
Woodward's fear that such an inquiry would have 
resulted in termination of the contract, it is inconc-
eivable that Collins, having just entered into the 
contract with Woodward, would have terminated 
the contract if Woodward had sought nothing more 
than its due under the contract. 
3. While the trial court reached the correct result 
applying the doctrine of waiver, other courts have 
reached the same result, on similar facts, under 
either an estoppel or contract theory- See, e.g., 
Celmer v. Schmitt, 198 Mom. 271, 645 P.2d 946, 
948 (1982) (An employee would be estopped from 
claiming compensation for overtime work where he 
failed to report it or to inform his employer that he 
expected compensation for it until he instituted suit 
after his discharge.). Cf. Abrams v. Horizon Corp., 
137 Ariz. 73, 669 P.2d 51, 57 (Ariz. 1983) 
(salesman's documentation of objection to empl-
oyer's failure to pay commissions precluded appli-
cation of doctrine that any course of performance 
acquiesced in without objection is given great weight 
in interpretation of ambiguous agreement). 
Cite as 
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OPINION 
ORME, Judge: 
Clearfield City seeks reversal of a district 
court order issuing an extraordinary writ in 
the nature of a writ of mandamus. The writ 
ordered Clearfield City to issue Davis County 
a conditional use permit for a group home. 
We affirm. 
FACTS 
On June 25, 1984, Davis County made 
application with the Clearfield City Planning 
Commission for a conditional use permit to 
operate a residential treatment program for 
adolescents and adults suffering from subst-
ance abuse. The proposed site was adjacent to 
another building operated by Davis County, 
known as the Addiction Recovery Center 
("ARC"). The sale of the property to Davis 
County by Victor Smith had been made 
subject to approval of the County's plans by 
Clearfield City. 
A public hearing to consider the permit was 
held on July 18 by the Clearfield City Plan-
ning Commission. A number of citizens atte-
nded and raised concerns about parking, an 
increased crime rate, and the reduction of 
property values in the vicinity. Concerns were 
also voiced that the use of the property for a 
group home would be incompatible with the 
"residential" nature of the surrounding area. 
The commission denied the application in a 
three to one vote, refusing to give any reason 
for its decision. As required by city ordinance,. 
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Davis County appealed the decision to the | 
Clearfield City Council. An inconclusive I 
hearing was held on September 11, with 
further consideration deferred to October 9. 
The Clearfield City Council met in a "pre- | 
meeting" on October 9 and discussed the 
conditional use permit. The Clearfield City 
Manager presented two maps to the City 
Council at the pre-meeting which were not 
presented at any public hearing. One map 
identified "neighborhoods" where the impact 
would be greatest if another group home was 
permitted. Based on the City Manager's ass-
essment, the two facilities combined would 
constitute 1107© of the neighborhood he iden-
tified. The other map showed various city 
zones and the location of basic social services 
within a one mile diameter of the proposed j 
site. These services included the Pioneer j 
School for the mentally handicapped, the 
ARC facility, the Clearfield Convalescent 
Center, and the Division of Family Services 
Center. 
In the formal portion of the October 9 
meeting, Councilwoman Reed made a motion 
to uphold the Planning Commission's decision 
and to deny the appeal for a conditional use 
permit. The motion earned.1 Davis County 
then filed suit in district court, claiming that I 
the actions of the City Council and the Plan-
ning Commission were unconstitutional and 
asking the court to issue a writ of mandamus 
requiring Clearfield to grant the conditional 
use permit. The case was heard on April 24 
and 25, 1986 and the trial court subsequently 
issued a memorandum decision ruling in favor | 
of Davis County and authorizing a writ of 
mandamus requiring Clearfield City to issue j 
the permit. 
The trial court found that the city's action 
in denying the permit was arbitrary, capric-
ious, discriminatory, and without substantial 
basis in fact. The court upheld the Clearfield 
City zoning ordinance as constitutional, but 
found that the city unconstitutionally applied 
it because there was no rational or reasonable 
basis to deny the permit. Clearfield's request 
for a stay of judgment was subsequently 
denied and this appeal followed.2 
Before turning to the merits of the appeal, it 
is necessary to review both the proper proce-
dure for judicial review of the city's action 
and the applicable standards of review. I 
I. PROPER PROCEDURE FOR REVIEW 
Judicial review of zoning decisions can be 
characterized as merely a variant of judicial j 
review of administrative decision-making. 7 I 
Rohan, Zoning and Land Use Controls i 
§52.01 (1986). Aside from that generaliza-
tion, there is inconsistency in how the process 
of review occurs. This is a result not only of a 
divergence of practice concerning whether 
state administrative procedure acts govern the 
review of zoning decisions, but also of the 
UTAH ADVA? 
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nuances within the various zoning enabling 
acts by which state legislatures have delegated 
the authority to enact and enforce zoning 
ordinances to municipalities. Therefore, judi-
cial review of local zoning or planning matters 
necessarily depends on the extent to which the 
state administrative procedure act is applic-
able, an interpretation of the enabling legisl-
ation, and the provisions of the pertinent local 
ordinance. See id. 
A. Review pursuant to state administrative 
procedure act 
Utah's newly created and long overdue 
Administrative Procedures Act, Ltah Code 
Ann. §§63-46b-l to -21 (1987), does not 
apply to this case. Although the Ltah Admi-
nistrative Procedures Act became effective 
January 1, 1988, 1987 Utah Laws ch. 161. 
§315, it does not apply to cases aireadv 
pending at its effective date. See Angell v. 
Board of Review, 750 P.2d 611, 612 n.2 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1988). Moreover, unlike in some 
states, the Utah act applies only to state and 
not to local agencies.3 See Utah Code Ann. 
§63-46b-l(l) (1987). The Utah act specif-
ically excludes application to "any political 
subdivision of the state, or anv administrative 
unit of a political subdivision of the state." 
Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-20)(b) (1937). 
B. Review pursuant to zoning statute 
Likewise, and contrary to the city's sugge-
stion on appeal, Davis County was precluded 
from using the statutory avenue of appeal 
intended as the vehicle for review of zoning 
decisions, Utah Code Ann. §10-9-15 
(1986), since this case involves an application 
to the Planning Commission and an appeal to 
the City Council, rather than a decision of the 
Board of Adjustment. Section 10-9-15 
provides, in relevant part: 
The city or any person aggrieved by 
any decision of the board of adju-
stment may have and maintain a 
plenary action for relief therefrom 
in any court of competent jurisdic-
tion .... 
Utah Code Ann. §10-9-15 (1987). 
The city argues that Davis County did not 
follow the proper procedure for judicial review 
of the Gty Council's decision because Davis 
County should have commenced the kind of 
action contemplated by §10-9-15 rather 
than seeking a writ of mandamus. The city 
cites the case of Crist v. Mapleton City, 28 
Utah 7, 497 P.2d 633 (1972), as authority for 
the proposition that mandamus is not a subs-
titute for appeal, in Crist, the Utah Supreme 
Court held that when an applicant has appe-
aled to a board of adjustment, mandamus is 
not available to compel issuance of a permit; 
the applicant must seek the "plain, speedy, 
and adequate remedy" of judicial review under 
§10-9-15. 497 P.2d at 634. 
4CE REPORTS 
Clearfield City 
v. Rep. 38 
In this case, however, Davis County was not 
in need of review of a board of adjustment 
decision. It was aggrieved by action of the 
City Council affirming the decision of the 
Planning Commission. There is no statutory 
recourse similar to §10-9-15 for review of 
city council action, apparently leaving the 
county with no recourse other than to obtain 
review by the traditional means of seeking an 
extraordinary writ or, more precisely, appro-
priate relief available where no other adequate 
remedy exists. See Utah R. Civ P 65B(a), 
(b)(3). 
C. Review pursuant to ordinance 
Notwithstanding the unavailability of stat-
utory review pursuant to §10-9-15, the city 
claims that Davis County was nonetheless 
required to appeal as prescribed by Clearfield 
City ordinance. The section of the Clearfield 
City ordinance governing the issuance of 
conditional use permits, at least as reproduced 
in our record, provides that appeals from the 
Planning Commission must proceed to review 
by the City Council. Appeals from the city 
council must then be taken to a court of 
competent jurisdiction pursuant to a provision 
similar, but not identical to, §10-9-15. 
That ordinance provision provides, in relevant 
part, with our emphasis added: 
Any person aggrieved by or aff-
ected by any decision of the Board 
of Adjustment or the City Council 
mav have and maintain a plenary 
action for relief therefrom in any 
court of competent jurisdiction .... 
While it is true that, if this provision were 
vahd, the county should have commenced "a 
plenary action for relief in the district court, 
the city cannot alter the scope and procedure 
for review required by §10-9-15 by simply 
inserting the words "or the City Council" into 
its ordinance. Where a route of review is 
provided by a state statute, a municipality 
lacks the power to alter that scheme. See, e.g., 
Cushing v. Smith, 457 A.2d 816, 820 (Me. 
1983). 
The Utah Supreme Court recently found a 
similar procedure invalid because it conflicted 
with Utah's enabling act, Utah Code Ann. 
§§10-9-1 to -18 (1986). Chambers v. 
Smithfield City, 714 P 2d 1133, 1137 (Utah 
1986). The enabling act provides that the leg-
islative body of a city, such as Clearfield's 
city council, has the right to regulate zoning, 
but in order to exercise that power, the legis-
lative body shall provide for a board of adj-
ustment to function as an appellate body for 
any person aggrieved by a zoning decision. 714 
P 2d at 1136. 
The Court m Chambers interpreted §10-9-
15 as expressing a clear legislative intent to 
vest the authority to grant variances solely 
with the board of adjustment. 714 P 2d at 
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1136 The ordinance at issue in Chambers 
required that variance requests be submitted to 
both the board of adjustment and the plan-
ning commission, with appeal to the city 
council The Court found that the city's pro-
cedures conflicted with the enabling act by 
vesting the city council, rather than the board 
of adjustment, with final authority over the 
determination whether or not to grant varia-
nces from the zoning ordinances 714 P 2d at 
1137 See Scherbel v Salt Lake City Corp , 81 
Utah Adv Rep. 15, 16 (1988) (board of adj-
ustment rather than city council is appropriate 
body to hear zoning appeals from planning 
commission under council-mayor form of 
government) 
While the Clearfield Cit> ordinance differs 
from the one in Chambers, it nonetheless also 
fails to provide for final review ot zoning 
matters by a board of adjustment as required 
by §10-9-15 and endeavors to vest the City 
Council with the final determination of con-
ditional use permits. \ legislative bodv may 
act as a board ot appeals only when the cre-
ation of a board of adjustment is not statut-
orily mandated 4 See 1 Rohan, Zoning and 
Land Use Controls §49 01(5] (1986) ('If the 
creation of a zoning board is mandatory, a 
local legislative body cannot reserve unto itself 
the sole power to grant or deny variances ') See 
also Scherbel v Salt Lake City Corp , 81 
Utah Adv Rep at 16 ("the authority to 
resolve zoning disputes is properly an execu-
tive function rather than a legislative one") 
Clearfield City cannot be heard to complain 
about the inappropnateness of the county's 
choice of procedure for obtaining judicial 
review in light of its own, flawed conditional 
use permit procedures Simply put, Clearfield 
Citv imposed on the county a procedure inc-
onsistent with that envisioned in the enabling 
act Having done so, it cannot insist on the 
method of district court review envisioned in 
that acts 
Since the Utah Administrative Procedures 
Act does not apply to local agencies and this is 
not an appeal pursuant to §10-9-15 nor 
any other statutonly-prescnbed scheme, 
Davis County was entitled to seek judicial 
review through a procedure traditionally used 
where review is not otherwise provided for 
Rule 65B of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
recognizes that appropriate relief may be 
granted "where the relief sought is to compel 
any inferior tnbunal, or any corporation, 
board or person to perform an act which the 
law specially enjoins as a dutv resulting from 
an office ..." Utah R. Civ P 65B(b)(3) 
Therefore, an action for extraordinary relief 
was the appropriate vehicle for obtaining 
review of the City Council's decision to 
uphold denial of the conditional use permit 
sought by Davis County * 
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II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW AND 
DEFERENCE 
The unique procedural posture of this case 
results in some confusion over the applicable 
standard of review both at the trial court level 
and on appellate review. While the appeal is 
taken from an administrative decision, the 
case found its way to district court in the 
context of a petition for an extraordinary writ. 
Thus, the nature of review by the district court 
was a hybrid proceeding involving some ele-
ments of administrative review and some ele-
ments of an independent civil action. That is, 
the trial court did not limit its review to con-
sideration of the record, as is typically the case 
in reviewing administrative decisions where a 
record is available, but heard two days of 
extensive testimony from various witnesses as 
is more typical of an independent civil action. 
A. Trial Court Review of Administrative 
Decision 
Clearfield City argues that the trial court 
erred in handling review of a city council 
decision as, in effect, a trial de novo and that 
the court should have been limited to consid-
eration of whether, on the record, the 
council's action was arbitrary and capricious 
and not supported by substantial evidence. 
The Utah Supreme Court recently addressed a 
similar argument in Xanthos v. Board of 
Adjustment, 685 P.2d 1032 (Utah 1984), 
which involved an appeal to the district court 
pursuant to §10-9-15 from a decision by a 
board of adjustment denying a variance. After 
a bench trial, at which the judge heard evid-
ence in addition to that adduced at the board 
hearing, the court reversed the board's deci-
sion and ordered the board to grant the vari-
ance. Salt Lake City argued, as Clearfield City 
argues in this case, that the court was limited 
to consideration of whether the board's action 
was arbitrary and capricious and not suppo-
rted by substantial evidence. 
The Utah Supreme Court defined the scope 
of review contemplated by the terms 'plenary 
action" as used in §10-9-15. "The nature 
and extent of the review depends on what 
happened below as reflected by a true record 
of the proceedings, viewed in the light of 
accepted due process requirements." Id. at 
1034 (quoting Denver & Rio Grande Western 
R. R. Co. v. Central Weber Sewer Improve-
mem Dist.f 4 Utah 2d 105, 287 P.2d 884, 887 (1955)). If the hearing had proceeded in acc-
ordance with due process requirements, the 
reviewing court must look only to the record 
"but where it had not or where there was 
nothing to review, the reviewing court must be 
allowed to get to the facts." Id. The Supreme 
Court concluded that the role of the trial court 
in reviewing the board's decision is to deter-
mine whether the action was so unreasonable 
as to be arbitrary and capricious, but "[i]n 
order to make that determination, the district 
court may take additional evidence *o .cru i> 
it is relevant to the issues that were raisM .mo 
considered by the board." Id. at 1035. « ^ 
Honn v. City of Coon Rapids. 313 N vv - J 
409, 416 (Minn. 1981); 3 Anderson. A.-ervan 
Law of Zoning §27.32 (1986) (a cour: -wo-
wing a decision of a local zoning bear J *:u> 
take additional evidence if necessary :o aid m 
the fair disposition of the caj>e). \d:u^d 
involved the question of the proper * tankard 
of review under §10-9-15, which fe not :he 
basis for this appeal as expiameu arv\e. 
However, its reasoning applies at least as 
readily to an action commenced pursuant to 
Rule 65B to secure a writ. 
Even though the record was per hap more 
extensive in this case than is typical in .'omnc 
matters, we find the trial court was justified in 
receiving additional evidence for at least two 
reasons. First, the trial court was concerned 
about the secretive nature and lack oi an* 
record or minutes of the City Council's pro-
meeting." Second, notwithstanding Davis 
County's request, the Planning Commission 
refused to give its reasons for denying the 
permit and the City Council refused to enter 
formal findings in support of its decision. 
Thus, in order to determine whether the action 
taken by the City Council was so unreasonable 
as to be arbitrary and capricious, the trial 
court received additional evidence to ascertain 
what transpired at the pre-meetmg and to 
discover the city's actual reasons for denying 
the permit.7 
B. Appellate Review of Trial Court Decision 
Assuming, as we have concluded, that it was 
appropriate for the trial court to hear additi-
onal testimony, the city argues that this court 
is nonetheless precluded from giving deference 
to the trial court's decision. Indeed, it is often 
stated that an appellate court owes no partic-
ular deference to a trial courts prior review 
of particular agency action.* 
See, e.g., Technomedicai Labs. Inc. v. s'ccunnfs 
Div., 744 P.2d 320 (Urah Ct. App. 1987). "When a 
lower court has reviewed the administrative decision 
and the court's judgment is challenged on appeal, 
we review the administrative decision just as • ! ine 
appeal had come directly from the agency." Id. ai 
321 n.l. See also Benmon v. Utah State /id. oi Oil, 
Gas & Mining, 675 P.2d 1135. 1139 ( I u h 19*1/. 
This doctrine, of course, makes sense on:> ;ii 'IK-' 
context of review of agency action on a record. UK. 
appellate court ordinarily gives no presumption oi 
correctness to the lower court decision becau v the 
lower court's review ot the administrative -ci/jrt! IN 
not ordinarily more advantaged than ine 4pr*e'!au 
court's review. Benmon v. Utah Slate fid. ni (hi. 
Gas & Mining, 675 P.2d at 1139 On 'he jther 
hand, when the trial court hears testimony p>m 
witnesses, as in this case, "we are part*cularl\ 
mindful of the advantaged position of the »nai wouri 
to hear, weigh and evaluate the tesumo.'.v A «hc 
parties." J & M Const. Inc., v. Southam. '22 I* 2d 
779, 779 (Utah 1986). See also fen^>: Br wi. W 
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P.2d 150, 152 (Utah l981)(court is "mindful of the 
advantaged position of the trial judge who sees and 
hears the witness* and therefore "give(sl due defer-
ence to his decisions"). 
Therefore, insofar as the trial court's decision 
turns on the administrative record, we give no par-
ticular deference to the trial court. But insofar as it 
turns on the testimony of witnesses, we defer to the 
trial court's advantaged position. 
HI. TRIAL COURT'S DECISION 
The trial court concluded that the Planning 
Commission's action in denying the conditi-
onal use permit and the City Council's action 
in upholding the denial were arbitrary and 
capricious and without substantial basis in 
fact. The court also concluded that the Plan-
ning Commission and the City Council unco-
nstitutionally applied the applicable provisions 
of the zoning ordinance. 
A. Lack of evidence supporting city's decision 
In its memorandum decision, the trial court 
explained that the Planning Commission's 
refusal to furnish written findings or at least 
provide the basis for its decision so that Davis 
County could intelligently respond on appeal 
to the City Council, tended to suggest there 
was no rational basis for the Planning Com-
mission's decision. With regard to the City 
Council's decision, although the court caref-
ully reviewed the verbatim transcript of the 
public meetings provided by Da\is County, it 
found that "nowhere in the transcripts ... is 
there believable information or evidence on 
which the Clearfield City Council could have 
rationally believed that the proposed mental 
health facility would pose any special threat to 
Clearfield City's legitimate interest." Conse-
quently, the trial court's decision, for the 
most part, turned on testimony received by the 
court over a two day period in an effort to 
ascertain what the basis for the city's decision 
actually was. 
The court found that the pre-meeting held 
by the City Council on October 9, although 
"ostensibly" a public meeting, was not an 
open meeting, yet the merits of Davis 
County's application were discussed and 
council members obviously relied on inform-
ation supplied in that meeting. The court also 
found that the maps presented and relied upon 
in the pre-meeting were arbitrarily drawn and 
were not presented or explained at the public 
meeting. 
In its findings, the court reviewed the 
reasons suggested at trial for the council's 
denial of the permit and found that none were 
supported by the evidence. In response to the 
.concern that the proposed facility would create 
a danger or nuisance because of its proximity 
to the junior high school, the court noted that 
neither the Davis County School District nor 
the junior high administrators appeared at the 
public hearings to oppose the proposed faci-
lity. Similarly, the police department made a 
presentation suggesting that crime would not 
increase in the area if the facility were permi-
tted. 
With regard to the concern over real estate 
values, the court found that no studies were 
made and no opinions were given by profess-
ional real estate appraisers nor was any cred-
ible evidence of reduced property values pro-
duced at the hearings. In a similar vein, two 
professional planners were employed by the 
city but neither voiced any objection to gran-
ting the application. 
Even if the reasons given in the motion 
adopted by the council might otherwise be 
legally sufficient, see Note 1, supra, the denial 
of a permit is arbitrary when the reasons are 
without sufficient factual basis. See, e.g.. C.R. 
In vs., Inc. v. Village of Shoreview, 304 
N.W.2d 320 (Minn. 1981). In Shoreview, 
several single-family homeowners objected to 
the use of land in their vicinity for construc-
tion of multiple dwellings. At the public 
meeting, they expressed concerns about traffic 
problems, reduced property values, and 
density. The court in Shoreview reviewed these 
reasons and concluded that the planning 
commission's stated reasons for denying the 
special use permit, an action which was upheld 
by the city council, did not have factual 
support in the "vague reservations expressed 
by either the single family owners or the 
commission members." Id. at 325. The court 
found the reasons did not justify denial of the 
permit "even though they would have been 
legally sufficient had the record demonstrated 
a factual basis for them." Id. 
B. "Public ciamor" 
Based on its review of the testimony, and 
the lack of any credible evidence in support of 
the city council's articulated reasons for 
denying the application, the trial court found 
that the city council's decision was based on 
"public clamor,"9 which was not a legally 
sufficient basis for denying the permit. The 
court explained: 
Indeed, there is almost uniform 
public clamor when any mental 
health facility, halfway house, jail 
or prison is proposed. The public 
realizes the need for such facilities, 
but they should always be located 
somewhere else .... Citizen opposi-
tion is a consideration which must 
be weighed, but cannot be the sole 
basis for the decision to deny. 
The Utah Supreme Court recognized the 
validity of the trial court's concern in Thur-
ston v. Cache County, 626 P.2d 440 (Utah 
1981). In Thurston, the Court, in upholding 
the Cache County Planning Commission's 
denial of conditional use permits to build 
residences in an agricultural area, acknowle-
dged that, while there is no impropriety in the 
UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS 
CODE*CO 
Provo. Utah 82"DVah Adv. Rep. 38 43 
solicitation of or reliance on the advice of 
neighboring landowners, "the consent of nei-
ghboring landowners may not be made a cri-
terion for the issuance or denial [of] a condi-
tional use permit. * Id. at 445. 
In a case factually more similar to the 
instant one, the Wyoming Supreme Court 
stated that "[tjhe opposition of neighbors is 
not one of the considerations to be taken into 
account" when determining whether to issue a 
development permit. Board of County 
Comm'rs v. Teton County Youth Services 
Inc., 652 P.2d 400, 411 (Wyo. 1982). In that 
case, the county commission denied an appli-
cation for a development permit, submitted by 
Youth Services, to use an existing facility as 
an alternative residential treatment center for 
the care and treatment of juveniles in need of 
supervision or emotionally and socially hand-
icapped. The Wyoming Supreme Court agreed 
with the trial court that the commission's 
decision had to be set aside since the commi-
ssion found that neighbors opposed the pro-
posed development and the court could not 
determine the weight the commission gave to 
such "unauthorized criteria" in making its 
decision. Id. at 411. 
In another case involving judicial review of 
local action denying conditional use permits, Ci-
ty of Barnum v. County of Carlton, 386 
N.W. 2d 770, affirmed on remand, 394 N.W. 
2d 246 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986), the City of 
Barnum sought a writ'of mandamus to compel 
the county board to issue a conditional use 
permit to allow it to construct a wastewater 
treatment facility. The district court denied the 
writ and the city appealed. The Minnesota 
Court of Appeals found that Carlton County 
acted arbitrarily and capriciously in denying 
the city's application and reversed the district 
court and remanded with instructions to issue 
the writ of mandamus ordering the county 
board to issue the conditional use permit. 386 
N.W. 2d at 776. The court in Barnum. noting 
that the failure by the county board to make 
sufficient findings in support of its decision 
made the court's task of review "highly imp-
ractical" because "[t]here is no way to deter-
mine from the record ... what the county 
board's thinking was when it denied the con-
ditional use permit," id. at 775, rejected the 
county's argument that its decision was based 
upon concerns aired by property owners at the 
public meeting. The court stated that though 
these sentiments may be weighed in a zoning 
decision, "they may not be the sole basis for 
granting or denying a given permit." Id. The 
court characterized the county's decision in 
these terms: 
Its decision appears to have been 
merely a response to public oppos-
ition. This is an insufficient basis 
upon which to deny a conditional 
use permit. A county must rely on 
facts, and not mere emotion or 
local opinion, in making such a 
decision. 
Id. at 776. Accord, Chanhassen Estates Resi-
dents Ass'n v. City of Chanhassen, 342 N.W. 
2d 335, 340 (Minn. 1984) ("[Dlenial of a 
conditional use must be based on something 
more concrete than neighborhood opposition 
and expressions of concern for public safety 
and welfare."). 
C. Conclusion 
While the reasons given by the Clearfield 
City Council for denying the permit might be 
legally sufficient if supported, the trial court 
was correct in concluding that the offered 
reasons are without factual basis in the record. 
What the court found to be the real reason for 
the action, "public clamor," is not an adeq-
uate legal basis for the city's decision. Ther-
efore, we agree with the trial court that Clea-
rfield City acted arbitrarily and capriciously in 
denying the conditional use permit for reasons 
which either had no factual basis or were not 
legally sufficient. Because we find the decision 
arbitrary and capricious, we have no need to 
consider whether the city's ordinance was 
unconstitutional on its face or as applied.10. 
Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's deci-
sion. 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
Judith M. Billings, Judge 
1. The motion referred to the following "reasons": 
Clearfield's responsiveness to the com-
munity and the County's special needs 
by four structured residential and resi-
dential-type facilities within the radius 
of one mile: and that 11°M> ot the land 
would be designated to this particular 
tyDe of structured residential use; and 
that to uphold the Clearfield master 
plan and zoning ordinance to minimize 
the changes of the characteristics of the 
neighborhood. 
2. We are advised that, upon demah of the motion 
for stay, the county closed its .transaction *ith 
Victor Smith, acquired the sue, made such renova-
tions as might have been necessarv to adapt the 
large residence to the county's purpose, and has 
continuously operated the treatment tacilit\ for 
some two years now. 
3. While some states have specifically made their 
administrative procedure acts applicable to local 
agencies, at least one state has achieved the same 
result through the interpretation ol rules ot proce-
dure. See, e.g., Board of County Comm'rs v. Teton 
County Youth Servs. Inc., 652 P.2d 400, 416 (W>o. 
1982). Assuming favorable experience with the Ltah 
Administrative Procedures Act, the Legislature may, 
in due course, wish to consider extending its appli-
cation to local agencies. 
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4. The enabling act for aty zoning is different from 
the enabling act for county zoning. The county act 
makes the decision to appoint a board of adjust-
ment discretionary with the county commission 
rather than mandatory as under the city enabling 
act. Chambers v. Smithfield City, 714 P.2d 1133, 
1137 (Utah 1986). 
5. The county might have premised its attack on the 
City Council's action on the ground that the council 
was not authorized to hear the zoning appeal. See, 
e.g., Scherbei v. Salt Lake City Corp., 81 Utah 
Adv. Rep. at 16. It did not do so. Nor does the city 
contend in this appeal that the county should have 
appealed to a body other than the City Council, a 
position it would in any event be estopped from 
asserting. The city's point is that the City Council 
functioned as a kind of board of adjustment and 
that, therefore, judicial review of its decision should 
have been accomplished in the same way as review 
of board of adjustment decisions. 
6. By either route, mandamus or review pursuant to 
the statute, thjuase would have ended up in district 
court. It ma/oe that denominating the proceeding 
as "mandamus" or as a "plenary action" under §10-
9-15 is neither determinative nor "anything other 
than a technicality which did not adversely affect 
the rights of the parties." Crist v. Maplcton City, 
497 P.2d 633, 636 (Utah 1972) (Crockett, J., disse-
nting). The city apparently believes its decision 
would be entitled to more deference if reviewed 
under §10-9-15 than in the context of a mand-
amus action. Of couse, whatever minimal benefit 
the county receives by virtue of its appeal being in 
the mandamus context is a direct consequence of the 
city's own questionable procedure for obtaining a 
conditional use permit. 
7. We note that in taking additional evidence and 
making its detailed findings, the trial court made a 
fair and disciplined effort to understand the basis 
for the city's decision. In no sense did it venture 
beyond its role as the court was said to have done in 
Xanthos and decide the case "according to [its] 
notion of what was in the best interests of the citi-
zens" of Clearfield City. Xanthos v. Board of Adj-
ustment, 685 P.2d at 1035. 
8. That notion has always been a bit of an oversta-
tement. Even if not strictly required, deference is no 
doubt given where the trial court's analysis is illu-
minating. Cf. Zions First Natl'l Bank v. National 
Am. Title Ins. Co., 749 P.2d 651, 654 (Utah 1988) 
("Although we may not defer to a trial court's 
conclusion on a legal question, we certainly may 
derive great benefit from the trial judge's views on 
the issue and may be persuaded by those views."). 
In any case, the Utah practice of duplicative, two-
tiered judicial review of agency action has been time-
consuming and inefficient. The Utah Administrative 
Procedures Act wisely breaks from this approach. 
Informal agency action, where no record is made, 
will be reviewed in district court on a trial de novo 
basis, in connection with which a record will be 
generated. See Utah Code Ann. §6J-46b-l5(l)(a) 
(1986). Appellate review would proceed on the 
record made in the trial court. Conversely, formal 
agency action, which generates a record, is reviewed 
directly by this court or by the Utah Supreme 
Court. See Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-16(l) 
(1986). This approach leaves each level of court 
doing what it does best-trial courts receiving and 
evaluating testimony and appellate courts reviewing 
records and resolving legal issues. 
9. The clamor is typified by the curious action taken 
at the Planning Commission hearing, where citizens 
in attendance were asked to vote on the application. 
Only one person voted for the facility and all others 
in the audience voted against it. 
10. As noted in section 1(c) of this opinion, the 
city's ordinance is inconsistent with generally appl-
icable state law, at least insofar as it vests in the city 
council, rather than a board of adjustment, the final 
word on applications for conditional use permits. In 
that sense, the ordinance is unconstitutional under 
the supremacy clause contained in Utah Const. Art. 
XI, §5. See AUgood v. Larson, 545 P.2d 530. 532 
(Utah 1976). 
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OPINION 
DAVIDSON, Judge: 
Plaintiff Richard Brimley appeals from the 
district court's order which: 1) granted defe-
ndant Joseph Gasser's motions for satisfac-
tion of judgment and relief from judgment; 
and 2) refused Brimley's motion that he was 
entitled to certain personal property of 
Gasser's which Brimley had purchased at a 
sheriffs sale. 
Although the parties to this appeal share a 
lengthy history, it is sufficient to begin on 
May 1, 1981, when Brimley obtained a default 
judgment against Gasser in the amount of 
536,650.00, with interest accruing at the rate 
of eight percent per annum. For one year 
Gasser ignored the judgment and paid 
nothing. Then, on May 29, 1982, Gasser exe-
cuted a promissory note payable to Brimley in 
the amount of $41,501.62 with interest accr-
uing at eighteen percent per annum. The note 
was due "on or before December 31, 1982 said 
loan to be secured by fifty thousand shares of 
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Civil No. 36431 
This case came before the Court for trial on April 24, 1986, 
with Gerald E. Hess appearing for the plaintiff, Davis County, 
Steven R. Bailey appearing for the plaintiff, Victor Smith, and 
Melvin C. Wilson appearing for the defendants, Clearfield City 
and Clearfield City Planning Commission. After presentation of 
evidence and argument, the court took the case under advisement. 
The court now rules on the case. 
The court finds the actions of the Clearfield City Council 
and the Clearfield City Planning Commission in denying a 
conditional use permit to Davis County for a mental health 
transitional facility to be arbitrary and capricious and without 
substantial basis in fact. Also, there was no rational basis for 
the denial. Clearfield City is ordered to approve the 
conditional use permit. The court does not, however, find the 
Clearfield City Zoning Ordinance unconstitutional. The court 
orders each party to pay their own costs. 
Davis County, through its Department of Mental Health made 
an application to Clearfield City on June 25, 1984, for a 
conditional use permit for a mental health transitional facility 
at 904 South State in Clearfield City. Clearfield City personnel 
aided Davis County in the preparation of a proper application. 
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The Clearfield City Planning Commission held a public hearing on 
July 18, 1984. The hearing lasted about two and one-half hours. 
The Planning Commission denied the application. No findings of 
fact or conclusions of law were made. Several persons present at 
the meeting expressed their opinions as to the basis for ruling. 
None are acceptable or authorized by the Planning Commission, 
however. Davis County wrote a letter on July 30, 1984, asking 
Clearfield City for formal findings of fact, conclusions of law, 
and decision so that it could intelligently respond to these 
matters on the appeal to the City Council. Clearfield City 
failed to furnish any. This court must, therefore, conclude that 
there was not a rational basis for such decision by the Planning 
Commission. 
The Clearfield City Council held public hearings on 
September 11, 1984, and October 9, 1984. The September 11 
meeting was a lengthy public meeting. All sides were given ample 
opportunity to present their views. The hearing was continued to 
October 9 so that research could be done on the application and 
so that a legal opinion could be obtained. 
The October 9 public meeting began at 7:15 P. M. It was a 
relatively short meeting. Councilwoman Shirley Reed made a 
motion almost at the beginning of the meeting to uphold the 
decision of the Planning Commission. The City Council had met in 
ostensibly a public meeting at 6:00 P. M. of the same evening 
without any outsiders being present and discussed the merits of 
the plaintiffs1 application. It in fact was not an open meeting. 
No minutes were taken of the meeting. The Council members 
obviously relied on information supplied in that meeting, 
however. This was evident from the statements made by them in 
the later meeting. 
No findings of fact, conclusions of law, or formal opinion 
came out of either the September 11 or October 9 meeting. 
Fortunately, the Davis County Mental Health tape recorded and 
transcribed both meetings verbatim. The court has read the 
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transcripts carefully. No where in the transcripts do I find 
believable information or evidence on which the Clearfield City 
Council could have rationally believed that the proposed mental 
health facility would pose any special threat to Clearfield 
City's legitimate interests. 
There is no zone in Clearfield wherein the proposed facility 
could be located as a matter of right. Davis County had to rely 
on a conditional us*e permit. Clearfield City's zoning ordinance 
changed just prior to the October 9, 1984, decision. Previous to 
the change 904 South State was located in a PO zone or 
professional office zone. This area had been changed from a 
residential zone to PO zone in about 1979. After the September 
1984 zone change it was known as a C-l zone. 
The evidence at the public hearings shows that residential 
zones are the preferable zones for the type of facility 
proposed by plaintiffs. There is, however, a stigma that is 
still attached to mental health facilities. It is generally 
believed that somehow the location of such a facility in a 
residential zone will endanger the residents of the area and 
lower property values. Believable studies show that neither of 
these propositions is true. Nevertheless, both Clearfield City 
and other cities in Davis County have been very reluctant to 
approve such facilities in residential zones. In an effort to 
accommodate such feelings, the Davis County Mental Health has 
made application for such facilities in zones that are not 
strictly residential. Such is the case here. The PO zone or C-l 
zone would appear to be an acceptable alternative to the more 
desirable residential zones. 
The evidence at the public hearings show that the decision 
to deny was made because of public clamor. Indeed, there is 
almost uniform public clamor when any mental health facility, 
halfway house, jail or prison is proposed. The public realizes 
the need for such facilities, but they should always be located 
somewhere else. The plaintiffs need in this case was to locate 
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in the North end of Davis County. This was to serve the needs of 
the citizens living in the North end of the County, although 
there would be persons from all parts of the County housed in the 
facility from time to time. Citizen opposition is a 
consideration which must be weighed, but cannot be the sole basis 
for the decision to deny. 
Two professional planners were involved in this case. 
Neither Wilford Summercorn, the Clearfield City Planner nor Wally 
Baird, the Clearfield City Manager could find any professional 
objection to the granting of the application. 
Some suggestion was made during the trial that Clearfield 
City was not doing its share to approve public service facilities 
within the City limits. Such a suggestion is absurd. Clearfield 
City has a great deal of public spirit and public responsibility. 
They are responsive to the needs of society. While occasionally 
disputes such as this arise, it does not take away from their 
willingness to promote the public good. 
Two areas of concern were put forth at the public hearings 
that deserve consideration. First was the idea that the proposed 
facility would create a danger or a nuisance because of its 
proximity to a junior high school, an alcohol rehabilitation 
center, and residents. Neither the Davis County School District 
nor the junior high administrators opposed the proposed facility. 
This was so even though it was public knowledge that the facility 
would house minors with drug problems and other mental health 
problems. The police department made a presentation at the 
hearings, but did not show that crime would increase in the area. 
There was some vague concern for possible future problems, but 
nothing concrete. The existence of the ARC just north of 904 
South State since 1981 had not created criminal problems in the 
area. No evidence showed any likelihood of increased social 
problems because this facility and the ARC would be adjacent to 
one another. 
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The second area of concern involved real estate values. 
Property owners expressed opinions that property values would go 
down. No studies were made however. No professional real 
estate appraisers gave their opinions, except for* the plaintiff, 
Victor Smith. His interest in the matter taints his testimony, 
but does not mean it should be disregarded. It was his opinion 
that the ARC had not impacted property values in the area and 
that the proposed facility would not. Some possible uses of the 
new C-l zone, such as a restaurant or garage or multiple 
apartment dwelling might lower property values, but not the 
proposed facility. No credible evidence of reduced property 
values was produced at the hearings. 
An argument was made that 11% of the land in a designated 
area would be devoted to public service uses if the application 
were granted. This 11% figure has no validity. The area 
included and excluded from the designated area was arbitrarily 
drawn. It did not include a separate neighborhood or the PO zone 
or any other area distinguishable on a reasonable basis. Also, 
the map used for the area, along with the conclusions to be drawn 
from the map were discussed at the preplanning meeting on October 
9, 1984, and not at the public hearing. The map was not used at 
the public meeting or explained to those present at the public 
meeting. 
An argument was made that Clearfield City did not want the 
proposed facility and the ARC adjacent to each other. No 
evidence was produced to show that any harm would come from the 
arrangement, except that the property would be taken off the tax 
producing rolls of Clearfield City. This was insufficient reason 
to justify a denial. 
An argument was made that there were four structured 
residential type facilities located within a radius of one mile 
of the proposed facility. The facts may be true but Clearfield 
City is only about 2.5 miles in diameter. After the application 
was denied, Clearfield City suggested five possible alternate 
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sites to Davis County. There was no guarantee that any of the 
five sites would be approved. Three of the five were near the 
hospital which is within Layton City limits. In that general 
vicinity there are seven or eight facilities including the 
hospital, two clinics, two doctors office buildings, a physical 
rehabilitation home, and an alcohol rehabilitation center. It 
appears that Clearfield City prefers to cluster these facilities 
into one area. There is nothing wrong with the clustering 
method, but in this case it does not meet the criteria for a 
residential transitional mental health facility, because of the 
lack of residential surroundings, bus transportation, schools, 
and churches. 
Perhaps an ultimate question is whether Davis County Mental 
Health can pick the site or Clearfield City can pick the site. 
The site proposed in the application is the only one having an 
existing facility. All other proposed sites require a building 
project. The answer is obvious. Davis County Mental Health has 
the right to pick their own site. If Clearfield City has a 
rational basis for denying the application, then its decision 
will be upheld. If reasons are given, but the reasons are 
specious or fail the reasonable person test, then the reasons 
will be disregarded. There must be substance to the reasons. 
A decision is said to be arbitrary when it is arrived at 
through will or caprice. A decision is capricious when it 
proceeds from whim or fancy. A decision is without basis in fact 
when it cannot be supported with rational facts and arguments. 
The decision of the Clearfield City Planning Commission and the 
Clearfield City Council was well intentioned, but falls into the 
above categories. 
The plaintiff, Davis County, is ordered to draw a formal 
opinion in conformity to this decision. 
-%-
Dated May 7, 1986. 
Certificate of Mailing: 
This is to certify that the undersigned mailed a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Memorandum Decision to Gerald E» 
Hess, Davis County Attorney's Office, Farmington, Utah; Melvin C« 
Wilson, 133 South State, Suite 203f Clearfield, Utah 84015 and 
Steven R. Bailey, 2564 Washington Blvd., Suite 2, Ogden, Utah 
84401 on May 8, 1986. 
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Davis County Attorney 
Courthouse Building 
Farmington, Utah 84025 
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CLEARFIELD CITY, a municipal 
corporation of the State of 
Utah and the 
CLEARFIELD CITY PLANNING 
COMMISSION, 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 36431 
The above matter, having come on regularly for trial on 
April 24, 1986, before the Honorable Douglas L. Cornaby, one of 
the judges of the above-entitled court; Plaintiff Davis County 
being represented by Gerald E. Hess, Deputy Davis County 
Attorney, and Plaintiff Victor Smith being represented by Steven 
R. Bailey, and Defendants being represented by Melvin C. Wilson; 
and witnesses having been called and testimony having been taken 
and exhibits having been introduced, and the Court being fully 
advised in the premises, now makes and enters the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Davis County, through its Department of Mental 
Health, made an application to Clearfield City on June 25, 1984 
f\Lt •j\eo 
for a Conditional Use Permit for a Mental Health Transitional 
Facility to be located at 904 South State in Clearfield, Utah. 
2. Davis County had obtained an earnest money 
agreement with Victor Smith for the purchase of the property 
located at 904 South State Street in Clearfield, Utah, subject to 
approval of the Conditional Use Permit by Clearfield City. 
3. Clearfield City personnel aided Davis County in the 
preparation of the application for a Conditional Use Permit. 
4. Pursuant to notice, the Clearfield City Planning 
Commission held a public hearing on July 18, 1984, to consider 
the application of Davis County, which hearing lasted 
approximately 2 1/2 hours. 
5. No accurate written record of the Planning 
Commission Hearing was preserved, and no findings of fact or 
conclusions of law were made. 
6. The Planning Commission voted to deny the 
Conditional Use Permit Application of Davis County. 
7. Several persons present at the meeting expressed 
their opinions as to the basis for the Planning Commission 
ruling, but no official or authorized reason for the ruling was 
ever stated by the Planning Commission. 
8. Clearfield City failed to furnish to Davis County 
any findings of fact, conclusions of law, or decision from the 
Clearfield City Planning Commission even though Davis County made 
written request for them. 
9. On.July 26, 1984, Davis County filed with 
Clearfield City a formal appeal of the denial of the Conditional 
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Use permit by the Clearfield City Planning Commission, which 
appeal was made to the Clearfield City Council in accordance with 
the Clearfield City Ordinances. 
10. The Clearfield City Council held public hearings on 
September 11, 1984, and thereafter on October 9, 1984, to 
consider the appeal of Davis County. 
11. The September 11, 1984, meeting was a lengthy public 
meeting where all sides were given ample opportunity to present 
theif views. 
12. The hearing of September 11, 1984, was continued to 
Octoper 9, 1984, at 7:15 p.m., so that research could be done on 
the application, and so that a legal opinion could be obtained. 
13. The October 9, 1984, continuation of the public 
hearing began at 7:15 p.m., and was a relatively short meeting. 
14. Councilwoman Shirley Reed made a motion almost at 
the beginning of the October 9, 1984, meeting to uphold the 
decision of the Planning Commission. 
15. The City Council had met in ostensibly a public 
meeting at 6:00 p.m. on October 9, 1986, without any outsiders 
being present or invited, and discussed the merits of the 
Application of Davis County. 
16. No minutes were taken of the portion of the City 
Council meeting which began at 6:00 p.m. on October 9, 1984. 
17. The City Council members relied on information 
supplied to them at the meeting which began at 6:00 p.m., and the 
information supplied to the City Council at the meeting which 
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began at 6:00 p.m. was not presented when the public hearing 
commenced at 7:15 p.m. on October 9, 1984. 
18. No findings of fact, conclusions of law, or formal 
opinion came out of either the September 11, 1984, meeting or the 
October 9, 1984, meeting. 
19. Although Clearfield City did not tape record or 
transcribe the proceedings of the public hearing, Davis County 
Mental Health recorded and transcribed both meetings verbatim, 
and nowhere in the transcripts is there believable information or 
evidence on which the Clearfield City Council could have 
rationally believed that the proposed Mental Health facility 
would pose any special threat to Clearfield City's legitimate 
interest. 
20. There is no zone in Clearfield City wherein the 
proposed facility could be located as a matter of right, and 
therefore, Plaintiff Davis County had to rely on a Conditional Use 
Permit in order to place a Mental Health facility in Clearfield 
City. 
21. Clearfield City's Zoning Ordinance changed just 
prior to the October 9, 1984, public hearing. Previous to the 
change, 904 South State was located in a PO zone, or Professional 
Office zone. 
22. The area located at approximately 904 South State 
Street, Clearfield, Utah, had been a residential zone prior to 
1979, but was changed to a PO zone in approximately 1979. 
23. After the September 1984 zone change, the subject 
property was included in a C-l zone. 
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23. At the public hearings, evidence was presented to 
the effect that residential zones are the preferable zones for 
the type of facility proposed by Plaintiffs Davis County. 
24. Evidence presented at the public hearings 
demonstrates there is a stigma attached to Mental Health 
facilities, so that many who live in residential zones believe 
they will be endangered by persons who will be housed in the 
Mental Health facility, and also that the property values in the 
vicinity will be lowered. 
25. Presented at the public hearings were believable 
studies which show that residents of the Mental Health facility 
proposed will not endanger residents-of the surrounding area, nor 
will the placement of a Mental Health facility lower property 
values in the area. 
26. Both Clearfield City and other cities in Davis 
County have been reluctant to approve Mental Health facilities in 
residential zones. In an effort to accommodate such feelings, the 
Davis County Mental Health has made application for such 
facilities in zones that are not strictly residential, such as 
the Professional Office zone in which the proposed facility is 
located. 
27. Placement of the Mental Health facility in the PO 
zone or C-l zone would appear to be an acceptable alternative to 
the more desirable residential zones. 
28. There was evidence presented at the public hearing 
that residents believed a Mental Health facility was a good idea, 
but not located near them. 
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29. The evidence at the public hearings show that the 
decision to deny was made because of public clamor. 
30. The Plaintiff's need as presented in the public 
hearing was to locate in the north end of Davis County, so as to 
serve the needs of the citizens living in the north end of Davis 
County. Although residents of Clearfield City would be assisted 
at the Mental Health Center, persons from all parts of the county 
would be housed in the facility from time to time. 
31. Two professional planners involved in the public 
hearings could find no significant professional objection to the 
granting of the application. 
33. Some suggestion was made during the trial that 
Clearfield City was not doing its share to approve public service 
facilities within the city limits; but the evidence shows 
Clearfield City has a great deal of public spirit and public 
responsibility, and are responsive to the needs of society, 
although occasionally disputes do arise, but it is clear that 
Clearfield City desires to promote the public good. 
34. Some members of the Clearfield City Planning 
Commission and the Clearfield City Council expressed concern that 
placement of the Mental Health facility would create a danger or 
nuisance because of its proximity to a junior high school, an 
Alcohol Rehabilitation Center, and to residents. 
35. Neither the Davis County School District nor any 
representative from the adjacent junior high appeared at the 
public hearings to oppose the proposed facility. 
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36. Dr. Russell Williams, Director of Davis County 
Mental Health, testified at the public hearings that placement of 
the Mental Health facility at the proposed location would not 
create any significant problems for residents of the facility, 
nor would residents of the facility create any danger or nuisance 
to students at the junior high school, Alcohol Rehabilitation 
residents, or local residents. 
37. The Clearfield City Police Department made a 
presentation at the hearings, but did not show that crime would 
increase in the area, although there was some vague concern 
expressed for possible future problems, but nothing concrete. 
38. The-existence of the ARC just north of 904 South 
State Street since 1981 had not created criminal problems in the 
area. 
39. No evidence presented to the Planning Commission 
showed any likelihood of increased social problems because this 
facility and the ARC would be adjacent to one another. 
40. No studies were made and no professional real 
estate appraisers presented any negative opinion to the hearings 
before the Planning Commission and the City Council, except for 
Plaintiff Victor Smith. His interest in the matter taints his 
testimony, but does not mean it should be disregarded. It was 
his opinion that the ARC had not impacted property values in the 
area, and that the proposed facility would not. Some possible 
uses of the new C-l zone such as a restaurant or garage or 
multiple apartment dwelling might lower property values, but not 
the proposed facility. 
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41. No evidence of reduced property values was produced 
at the hearings, except from persons who owned property in the 
area, and their concerns were based upon fear of what might 
happen, rather than upon any objective study. 
42. In the motion made by a Clearfield City 
Councilperson to deny the Conditional Use Permit, reference was 
made to the fact that eleven percent of land in a designated area 
would be devoted to public service uses if the application were 
granted. This eleven percent figure has no validity. The area 
included and excluded from the designated area was arbitrarily 
drawn. It did not include a separate neighborhood or the PO zone 
or any other area distinguishable on a reasonable basis. Also, 
the map used for the area, along with the conclusions to be drawn 
from the map were discussed at the preplanning meeting on October 
9, 1984, and not at the public hearing. The map was not used at 
the public meeting or explained to those present at the public 
meeting. 
43. No evidence was produced at the public hearing to 
show that any harm would come from the proposed facility being 
located adjacent to the present ARC, except that the property 
would be taken off the tax producing rolls of Clearfield City. 
44. Members of the Clearfield City Council indicated 
one reason for denial of the proposed facility was that there 
were four structured residential type facilities located within a 
radius of one mile of the proposed facility. 
45. Clearfield City is only about 2.5 miles in 
diameter. 
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46. After the Clearfield City Council denied the 
application, the city suggested five possible alternate sites to 
Davis County, but there was no guarantee that any of the five 
sites would be approved as a Conditional Use, either by the 
Clearfield City Planning Commission, or the Clearfield City 
Council. Three of the five sites were near the hospital which is 
within Layton City, 
47. Clearfield City requested and received from Davis 
County a great deal of information related to the economic 
feasibility of acquiring the Vic Smith property and transforming 
it into a Mental Health facility. 
48• Any of the sites recommended by Clearfield City 
were vacant properties and buildings would have been required to 
be constructed on the various sites. 
49. One Clearfield City Councilman who visited the ARC 
facility expressed fear and apprehension as he entered the 
facility, but after he had learned about the kind of people 
receiving treatment in the facility and the various treatment 
programs, his fear of the facility vanished. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes 
and enters the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Plaintiff has no plain and adequate remedy at law. 
2. Plaintiff Davis County has exhausted its 
administrative remedies. 
3. There was not a rational or reasonable basis for 
denial of the Application for Conditional Use Permit by the 
9 
Clearfield City Planning Commission, in that the Clearfield City 
Planning Commission unconstitionally applied Section 11 of 
Chapter 12 of the Clearfield Zoning Ordinance in violation of 
Section 7 and Section 24 of Article I of the Utah Constitution 
and of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution. 
4. The City Council meeting which commenced on October 
9, 1984, at 6:00 p.m. was not an open meeting, as required by the 
statutes of the State of Utah. 
5. Citizen opposition to the proposed Mental Health 
facility must be weighed, but cannot be the sole basis for the 
decision to deny the Conditional Use Permit. 
6. The actions of the Clearfield City Planning 
Commission and the Clearfield City Council in denying a 
Conditional Use"Permit to Plaintiff Davis County for a Mental 
Health Transitional Facility was arbitrary and capricious and 
discriminatory and without substantial basis in fact. 
7. There was no rational or reasonable basis for 
defendant Clearfield City Council to deny the Conditional Use 
Permit to Davis County, in that the Clearfield City Council 
unconstitutionally applied Section 11 of Chapter 12 of the ^^r0* 
Clearfield Zoning Ordinance in violation of Section 7 and Section 
24 of Article I of the Utah Constitution and of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
8. The Clearfield City Zoning Ordinance, in effect on 




9. A Writ of Mandamus should be issued ordering and 
requiring the Clearfield City Planning Commission and the 
Clearfield City Council to approve the Conditional Use Permit 
Application of Plaintiff Davis County, and issue a Conditional 
Use Permit to Davis County, thereby authorizing Davis County to 
operate a Mental Health Transitional Treatment facility at 904 
South State Street, Clearfield, Utah. 
10. Each party should be required to bear its own costs 
and attorney's fees. 
DATED this ,?^$? day of May, 1986. 
BY THE COURT: 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law to: 
Melvin C. Wilson 
Attorney at Law 
133 South State Street, Suite 203 
Clearfield, Utah 84015 
and ~ 
Steven R. Bailey 
Attorney at Law 
2564 Washington Blvd., Suite 2 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
with-pootage pyriipaisl thereon, this day of May, 1986. 
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WRIT OF MANDAMUS 
Civil No. 36431 
The above matter, having come on regularly for trial on 
April 24, 1986, before the Honorable Douglas L. Cornaby, one of 
the judges of the above-entitled court; Plaintiff Davis County 
being represented by Gerald E. Hess, Deputy Davis County 
Attorney, and Plaintiff Victor Smith being represented by Steven 
R. Bailey, and Defendants being represented by Melvin C. Wilson; 
and witnesses having been called and testimony having been taken 
and exhibits having been introduced, and the Court having made 
and entered its Findings of Fact and conclusions of law; 
NOW THEREFORE, it is hereby ordered, adjudged and 
decreed as follows: 
RLMED 
1. The Clearfield City Planning Commission and the 
Clearfield City Council are hereby ordered to approve the 
Conditional Use Permit Application of Plaintiff Davis County, and 
to issue a Conditional Use Permit to Plaintiff Davis County, 
thereby allowing and authorizing Davis County to operate a Mental 
Health Transitional Treatment Facility at the address commonly 
known as 904 South State Street, Clearfield, Utah. 
2. The Clearfield City Zoning Ordinance in effect on 
June 25, 1984, and subsequently amended is constitutional, and 
the request of Plaintiff Davis County to declare the ordinance 
unconstitutional is hereby denied with prejudice. 
3. Each party shall bear its own costs and attorney's 
fees. 
DATED this ^f day of May, 1986. 
BY THE COURT: 
MICHAEL G^ALLPJ-:«r., C L Z ^ K 
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Section Section 
10-9-28 Short title — Definitions 10-9-30 Violation of chapter or ordinance 
10-9-29 Severability clause — Jurisdiction of punishable as misdemeanor — 
commission over public prop- Remedies of municipality and 
erty owners of real estate. 
ARTICLE 1 
ZONING POWER OF CITIES AND TOWNS 
10-9-1. Power to regulate and restrict height and size of 
buildings and height and location of trees and 
other vegetation — Regulations to encourage use 
of solar and other forms of energy. 
For the purpose of promoting health, safety, morals and the general welfare 
of the community the legislative body of cities and towns is empowered to 
regulate and restrict the height, number of stories and size of buildings and 
other structures, the height and location of trees and other vegetation, the 
percentage of lot that may be occupied, the size of yards, courts and other open 
spaces, the density of population and the location and use of buildings, struc-
tures and land for trade, industry, residence or other purposes. Regulations 
and restrictions of the heights and number of stories of buildings and other 
structures, and the height and location of trees and other vegetation shall not 
apply to existing buildings, structures, trees or vegetation except for' new 
growth on such vegetation. These regulations may also enopurage energy-effi-
cient patterns of development, the use of solar and other renewable forms of 
energy, and energy conservation and may assure access to sunlight for solar 
energy devices. 
History: L. 1925, ch. 119, § 1; R.S. 1933, County zoning and planning, § 17-27-1 et 
15-8-89; L. 1941, ch. 18, & 1; C. 1943, 15-8-89; seq 
L. 1981, ch. 44, § 1. Lumberyards and combustible materials, 
Amendment Notes. — The 1981 amend-
 proh,bition within fire limits, § 10-8-70. 
ment inserted the height and location of trees
 M u m c i p a l Planning Enabling Act and 
and other vegetation in the first sentence, and
 r , . 4, , 
added the last two sentences ^ n ^ i o / thereunder, 
Cross-References. — Airport zoning regu- * 10*9-19 et seq. 
lations, & 2 4-1 et seq S l u m clearance, §§ 11-15-1 et seq., 11-19-1 
Building and fire regulations, § 10-8-52 et seq 
Conformity to zoning ordinances of other po- State planning coordinator, § 63-28-1 et seq. 
liticai subdivisions, ^ i 1-16-1 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Deed restrictions and covenants 
Fraternity and sorority houses 
Gasoline filling and service station 
Initiative power of the people 
Judicial review 
Prior nonconforming use 
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Key Numbers. — Municipal Corporations 
*» 600, 601. 
10-9-2. Division of city into zoning districts. 
For any or all of said purposes the legislative body may divide the munici-
pality into districts of such number, shape and area as may be deemed best 
suited to carry out the purposes of this article, and within such districts it may 
regulate and restrict the erection, construction, reconstruction, alteration, 
repair or use of buildings or structures, or the use of land. All such regulations 
shall be uniform for each class or kind of buildings throughout each district, 
but the regulations in one district may differ from those in other districts. 
History: L. 1925, ch. 119, § 2; R.S. 1933 & 
C. 1943, 15-8-90. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Discretion of governing board. 
Fraternity and sorority houses. 
Spot zoning. 
Discretion of governing board. 
By the terms of this section and §§ 10-9-1, 
10-9-3 and 10-9-4, the governing body of a city 
is granted discretionary power to district and 
zone cities for various purposes that are to the 
public interest; the exercise of that power will 
not be interfered with by the courts unless the 
discretion is abused. Phi Kappa Iota Fraternity 
v. Salt Lake City, 116 Utah 536, 212 P.2d 177 
(1949). 
Fraternity and sorority houses. 
Ordinance confining the location of frater-
nity or sorority houses, in restricted residential 
districts, to an area not more than 600 feet 
from lands and premises occupied by institu-
tion to which the fraternity or sorority is inci-
dent was valid as against contention that it 
was a discrimination against rightful use of 
the plaintiffs' premises. Phi Kappa Iota Frater-
nity v. Salt Lake City, 116 Utah 536, 212 P.2d 
177 (1949). 
Spot zoning. 
That the statute contemplates a division and 
regulation by districts, instead of regulation by 
single lots or small groups of lots, is evident. 
The regulation of the use of property by lots or 
by very small areas is not zoning and docs vio-
lence to the purpose and provisions of the stat-
ute. It would not, and could not, accomplish the 
purpose of the law as set forth in the statute. 
Marshall v. Salt Lake City, 105 Utah 111, 141 
P.2d 704, 149 A.L.R. 282 (1943). 
City must zone districts and not by indis-
criminate spot zoning, but this requirement 
does not necessitate that districts be confined 
and rigidly limited to one particular type of 
use. Marshall v. Salt Lake City, 105 Utah 111, 
141 P.2d 704, 149 A.L.R. 282 (1943). 
The cases relative to "spot zoning" are gener-
ally cases where a particular small tract 
within a large district is specially zoned so as 
to impose upon it restrictions not imposed upon 
the surrounding lands, or grant to it special 
privileges not granted generally, not done in 
pursuance of any general or comprehensive 
plan. Marshall v. Salt Lake City, 105 Utah 
111, 141 P.2d 704, 149 A.L.R. 282 (1943). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 58 Am. Jur. 2d Zoning § 32 
et seq. 
C.J.S. — 101A C.J.S. Zoning and Land Plan-
ning §§ 40 to 42. 
Key Numbers. — Zoning «=> 31. 
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10-9-2.5. Residential facility for handicapped persons per-
mitted in municipal zoning district — Conditions 
for qualification. 
A residential facility for handicapped persons shall be permitted m any 
municipal zoning district, subject to the conditional review process, except a 
district zoned to permit, exclusively, single family dwelling use, if the facility 
conforms to all applicable health, safety, and building codes and is capable of 
use as a residential facility for handicapped persons without structural alter-
ation which would change the residential character of the structure For pur-
poses of this section "zoned to permit exclusively single family dwelling use" 
means that the applicable ordinance prohibits the occupancy of a housing 
structure by any more than one family 
A municipality, by ordinance, may provide that no residential facility for 
handicapped persons may be established or maintained within one mile of 
another existing facility 
The use granted and permitted by this section is nontransferable and termi-
nates if the structure is devoted to a use other than as a residential facility for 
handicapped peisons or, if the structure fails to comply with applicable 
health, safety, and building codes 
The governing body of each municipality under locally adopted criteria 
shall adopt zoning ordinances which permit, through the grant of conditional 
use permits, the establishment and maintenance of residential facilities for 
handicapped persons within districts zoned to permit exclusively single family 
dwelling use Such ordinances may require that no residential facility for 
handicapped persons be established or maintained within one mile of another 
existing facility Those ordinances shall prohibit discrimination against resi-
dential facilities for handicapped persons. 
No person who is being treated for alcoholism or drug abuse shall be placed 
in a residential facility for handicapped persons. Placement shall be on a 
strictly voluntary basis and shall not be a part of or in lieu of confinement, 
rehabilitation, or treatment in a custodial or correctional type institution. 
For purposes of this section, "residential facility for handicapped persons' 
means a single-family dwelling structure that is occupied on a 24-hour per 
day basis by eight or less handicapped persons in a family-type arrangement 
under the supervision of house parents or a manager The facility shall be 
operated or licensed and regulated by a state agency and if not so operated, 
licensed, or regulated, it shall comply with all state standards for group home 
operations 
For purposes of this section, "handicapped person" means a person who is 
nonviolent and who has a severe, chronic disability attributable to a mental or 
physical impairment or to a combination of mental and physical impairments 
which is likely to continue indefinitely and which results in a substantial 
functional limitation in three or more of the following areas of major life 
activity self-care, receptive and expressive language, learning, mobility, self-
direction, capacity for independent living, economic self-sufficiency, and who 
requires a combination or sequence of special interdisciplinary or generic 
care, treatment, or other services that are individually planned and coordi-
nated to allow the person to function in, and contribute to, a residential neigh-
borhood 
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History: C. 1953, 10-9-2.5, enacted by L. 
1981, ch. 51, § 1; L. 1985, ch. 105, § 1. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1985 amend-
ment substituted "and is capable of use as a 
residential facility for handicapped persons 
without structural alteration which would 
change the residential character of the struc-
ture" for "and if it is capable of use as such a 
facility without structural alteration that 
changes the residential character of the struc-
History: L. 1925, ch. 119, § 3; R.S. 1933 & 
C. 1943, 15-8-91; L. 1981, ch. 44, § 2. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1981 amend-




—Fraternity and sorority houses. 
Discretion of governing board. 




Comprehensive zoning plans ore valid. Mar-
shall v. Salt Lake City, 105 Utah 111, 141 P.2d 
704, 149 A.L.R. 282 (1943). 
—Fraternity and sorority houses. 
Ordinance confining the location of frater-
nity or sorority houses, in restricted residential 
district, to an area not more than 600 feet from 
the lands and premises occupied by the institu-
tion to which the fraternity or sorority is inci-
ture in which the facility is housed" in the first 
paragraph; in the third paragraph, deleted "in 
which the facility is housed" preceding "is de-
voted to" and inserted "a" preceding "use"; 
added the last sentence to the fourth para-
graph; deieted "mental illness" following "alco-
holism" in the fifth paragraph; inserted "who is 
nonviolent and" after "means a person" in the 
last paragraph; and made several minor 
punctuation changes. 
patterns of development, the use of energy con-
servation, solar, and renewable energy sources, 
and to assure access to sunlight for solar 
energy devices" in the first sentence. 
dent was valid as against contention that it 
was a discrimination against the rightful use 
of the plaintiffs' premises. Phi Kappa loin Fra-
ternity v. Salt Lake City, 116 Utah 53(5, 212 
P.2d 177 (1949). 
Discretion of governing board. 
By the terms of this section and §§ 10-9-1 
and 10-9-4, the governing body of a city is 
granted discretionary power to district and 
zone cities for various purposes that are to the 
public interest; the exercise of that power will 
not be interfered with by the courts unless the 
10-9-3. Regulations to be in accordance with comprehen-
sive plan. 
Such regulations shall be made in accordance with a comprehensive plan 
designed to lessen congestion in the streets, to secure safety from fire, panic 
and other dangers, to promote health and the general welfare, to encourage 
energy-efficient patterns of development, the use of energy conservation, so-
lar, and renewable energy sources, and to assure access to sunlight for solar 
energy devices, to provide adequate light and air, to prevent the overcrowding 
of land, to avoid undue concentration of population, to facilitate adequate 
provision for transportation, water, sewage, schools, parks and other public 
requirements. Such regulations shall be made with reasonable consideration, 
among other things, to the character of the district and its peculiar suitability 
for particular uses, and with a view to conserving the value of buildings and 
encouraging the most appropriate use of land throughout the city. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
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and comfortable living by the inhabitants of 
the districts and the city as a whole. Marshall 
v. Salt Lake City, 105 Utah 111, 141 P.2d 704, 
149 A.L.R. 282 (1943). 
Subdivisions. 
A city ordinance requiring subdividers to 
dedicate 7 percent of the subdivision's land to 
the city, or pay the equivalent of that value in 
cash for flood control and/or parks and recre-
ation facilities was within the scope of author-
ity and responsibility of the city government in 
the promotion of the health, safety, morals and 
general welfare of the community. Call v. City 
of West Jordan, 606 P.2d 217 (Utah 1979). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 58 Am. Jur. 2d Zoning § 27. cials to cancel permit granted in violation of 
C.J.S.—101AC.J.S. Zoning and Land Plan- zoning regulation, 68 A.L.R.3d 166. 
ning § 39. Key Numbers. — Zoning «=» 30. 
A.L.R. — Mandamus to compel zoning offi-
10-9-3.5. Regulation of subdivision development plans to 
protect access to sunlight for solar energy. 
The legislative body, in order to protect and assure access to sunlight for 
solar energy devices, may adopt regulations governing subdivision develop-
ment plans that relate to the use of restrictive convenants [covenants] or solar 
easements, height restrictions, side yard and setback requirements, street and 
building orientation and width requirements, height and location of vegeta-
tion with respect to property boundary lines and other permissible forms of 
land use controls. 
History: C. 1953, 10-9-3.5, enacted by L. Compiler's Notes. — The bracketed word 
1981, ch. 44, § 3. "covenants" was inserted by the compiler. 
10-9-3.6. Disapproval of plats or agreements which pro-
hibit solar or other energy devices. 
The legislative body may refuse to approve or renew any plat or subdivision 
plan, or the dedication of any street or other ground, if the deed restrictions, 
convenants [covenants] or similar binding agreements running with the land 
for the lots or parcel covered by the plat or subdivision prohibit or have the 
effect of prohibiting reasonably sited and designed solar collectors, 
clotheslines or other energy devices based on renewable resources from being 
installed on buildings erected on lots or parcels covered by the plat or subdivi-
sion. 
History: C. 1953, 10-9-3.6, enacted by L. Compiler's Notes. — The bracketed word 
1981, ch. 44, § 4. "covenants" was inserted by the compiler. 
discretion is abused. Phi Kappa Iota Fraternity 
v. Salt Lake City, 116 Utah 536, 212 P.2d 177 
(1949). 
Purposes of zoning. 
The purposes which control and must be sub-
served by any zoning are set forth in this sec-
tion. The elements required of a zoning plan 
are: It must be comprehensive; it must be de-
signed to protect the health, safety, and morals 
of the inhabitants; promote the general wel-
fare; avoid overcrowding and congestion in 
traffic and population; facilitate transportation 
and other public service; and meet the ordinary 
or common requirements of happy, convenient 
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10-9-4. Planning commission — Zoning plan, ordinance, 
maps and recommendations — Certification to 
legislative body — Zoning of municipality. 
In order to more fully avail itself of the powers conferred by this chapter to 
the mayor, with the advice and consent of the legislative body, may appoint a 
commission to be known as the planning commission. The planning commis-
sion, through its own initiative may, or by order of the legislative body of the 
municipality shall, make and certify to the legislative body a zoning plan, 
including both the full text of the zoning ordinance and maps, and represent-
ing the planning commission's recommendations for zoning the municipality. 
The legislative body may, after receiving the recommendations of the plan-
ning commission for the zoning of the municipality, divide the municipality 
into districts or zones of such number, shape, and area as it may determine, 
and within such districts may regulate the erection, construction, reconstruc-
tion, alteration, and uses of buildings and structures, and the uses of land. 
History: L. 1925, ch. 119, § 4; R.S. 1933 & and consent of the legislative body" for "such 
C. 1943,15-8-92; L. 1949, ch. 15, § 1; 1983, ch. legislative body". 
33, § 5. Cross-References. — Municipal Planning 
Amendment Notes. — The 1983 amend- Enabling Act and planning commissions there-
ment substituted "the mayor, with the advice under, § 10-9-19 et seq. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Discretion of city council. 
Fraternity and sorority houses. 
Spot zoning. 
Discretion of city council. 
The discretion of the governing body of a city 
is very extensive with regard to the wisdom of 
the plan, the necessity for the zoning, the num-
ber and the nature of the districts to be cre-
ated, the boundaries thereof and the uses per-
mitted therein. It is the primary duty of the 
city to make the classifications. If a classifica-
tion is reasonably doubtful, the judgment of 
the court will not be substituted for the judg-
ment of the city. In short, unless the action of 
the governing body of the city is arbitrary, dis-
criminatory or unreasonable, or clearly offends 
some provision of the Constitution or another 
statute, the court must uphold it, if it is within 
the municipality's grant of power. Marshall v. 
Salt Lake City, 105 Utah 111, 141 P.2d 704, 
149 A.L.R. 282 (1943), 
By the terms of this section and §§ 10-9-1 to 
10-9-3, the governing body of a city is granted 
discretionary power to district and zone cities 
for various purposes that are to the public in-
terest; the exercise of that power will not be 
interfered with by the courts unless the discre-
tion is abused. Phi Kappa Iota Fraternity v. 
Salt Lake City, 116 Utah 536, 212 f\2d 177 
(1949). 
Fraternity and sorority houses. 
Ordinance confining the location of frater-
nity or sorority houses, in restricted residential 
district, to an area not more than 600 feet from 
the lands and premises occupied by institution 
to which the fraternity or sorority is incident 
was valid as against contention that it was a 
discrimination against the rightful use of the 
plaintiffs' premises. Phi Kappa Iota Fraternity 
v. SaU Lake City, 116 Utah 536, 212 P.2d 117 
(1949). 
Spot zoning. 
Zoning ordinances, to the extent that they 
provided for small spot Residential "C" or Resi-
dential "B3" districts, did not violate require-
ment of comprehensive zoning plan. Provisions 
creating very small areas for limited business 
purposes detached from "C" or "B3" districts 
were not objectionable as "spot zoning," or as 
offending against the rule that zoning must be 
by districts. Marshall v. Salt Lake City. 105 
Utah 111, 141 P.2d 704,149 A.L.R. 282 (1943). 
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10-9-5. Zoning ordinances — Procedures — Assigning 
zones to territory annexed to the territory. 
(1) No zoning ordinance, map, or amendment thereto may be adopted until 
the legislative body has given at least 15 days published notice of the time, 
place, and purpose at which the zoning ordinance, map, or amendment is to be 
considered and public comment heard. 
(2) No zoning ordinance, map, or amendment may be adopted by the legis-
lative body unless the planning commission has reviewed and made recom-
mendations to the legislative body regarding that ordinance, map, or amend-
ment. 
(3) The planning commission shall have 30 days to respond to any request 
from the legislative body for recommendation and if none is received within 
30 days after the request is made to the chair of the planning commission, the 
legislative body may adopt the zoning ordinance, map, or amendment in the 
manner required by Subsection (2). 
(4) The legislative body may assign a zone to territory annexed to the mu-
nicipality at the time the territory is annexed. 
(5) If a municipality does not have a zoning ordinance which shows a zone 
for territory to be annexed to the municipality, or if the legislative body does 
not assign a zone to territory at the time it is annexed, territory annexed to a 
municipality shall be zoned according to the zone of the annexing municipal-
ity with which it has the most common boundary. 
History: C. 1953, 10-9-5, enacted by L. 
1985, ch. 87, § 1. 
Repeals and Enactments. — Laws 1985, 
ch. 87, § 1 repealed former § 10-9-5 (L. 1925, 
ANALYSIS 
Failure to follow procedural requirements. 
—Rights of property owners. 
Notice of hearing. 
Failure to follow procedural requirements. 
—Rights of property owners. 
Inasmuch as a zoning ordinance classifying 
certain property as residential was void for 
want of compliance with mandatory notice and 
hearing requirements, the property intended to 
be affected thereby was unzoned. The court, in 
a suit by certain affected property owners, was 
limited to the remedy of declaring the ordi-
nance void and to providing injunctive relief 
against the city, entitling the property owners 
to use or sell their property for a restaurant or 
a similar use, as they desired. The court erred 
in declaring the ordinance void, but denying 
injunctive relief, on the ground that the 
owners, proposed use of their property would 
ch. 119, § 5; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 15-8-93; L. 
1949, ch. 15, § 1), relating to the enactment of 
zoning ordinance, and enacted the present 
§ 10-9-5. 
not have been in the "public interest." Carter 
v. City of Salina, 773 F.2d 251 (10th Cir. 1985). 
Notice of hearing. 
Zoning ordinance was not invalid for failure 
of the commission to give proper notice where 
the required fifteen-days notice stated the re-
quested change was from "Residential R-6" to 
"Commercial C-3," and the change eventually 
made by the commission was to "Business 
B-3," since everything allowed by a "Business 
B-3" classification was included within the 
more comprehensive "Commercial C-3," and 
those complaining of lack of proper notice had 
actual notice and participated in the hearing. 
Naylor v. Salt Lake City Corp., 17 Utah 2d 
300, 410 P.2d 764 (1966). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Note, Urban Plan-
ning and Development — Race and Poverty — 
Past, Present and Future, 1971 Utah L Rev 
46 
Am. Ju r . 2d. — 58 Am Jur 2d Zoning 
§§ 10, 169 et seq 
C.J.S. — 62 C J S Municipal Corporations 
* 226, 101A C J S Zoning and Land Planning 
^ 12 to 15, 65 et seq 
History: L. 1925, ch. 119, § 7; R.S. 1933 & 
C. 1943, 15-8-95; L. 1949, ch. 15, § 1; 1983, ch. 
33, $ 6. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1983 amend-
ANALYSIS 
Prior nonconforming use 
Rules and regulations 
Prior nonconforming use. 
Excavation of sand and gravel was valid 
nonconforming use and could not be enjoined 
under zoning ordinance proscribing such use 
since gravel operation had been conducted 
prior to the enactment of the ordinance, nature 
of extractive business contemplated contin-
uance of use over entire paicel of land without 
rcslnclion to immediate aica excavutcd at the 
time the ordinance was passed, and noncon-
forming status was not lost because ownership 
A.L.R. — Validity and construction of provi-
sions of zoning statute or ordinance regarding 
protest by neighbonng property owners, 7 
A L R 4th 732 
Key Numbers. — Municipal Corporations 
«=» 601 1, Zoning «=» 15, 193 to 195, 359 
ment substituted "chapter" for "article" 
throughout the section, inserted "the mayor, 
with the advice and consent of", and made a 
minor change in phraseology 
of land had changed since enactment of ordi-
nance Gibbons & Reed Co v North Salt Lake 
City, 19 Utah 2d 329, 431 P 2d 559 (1967) 
Rules and regulations. 
The board may make such rules and regula-
tions as are reasonably necessary or expedient 
to enable it to carry out its administrative 
functions and duties, but not the duties and 
poweis of the commission Walton v Traty 
Loan & Trust Co, 97 Utah 249, 92 P 2d 724 
(1939) 
10-9-6. Board of adjustment — Appointment — Limitation 
on exercise of powers as to restrictions on use of 
property — Exemption from operation of ordi-
nance. 
In order to avail itself of the powers provided in this chapter the mayor, 
with the advice and consent of the legislative body, shall appoint a board of 
adjustment, and in the regulations and restrictions adopted pursuant to au-
thority under this chapter shall provide that the powers by this chapter given 
shall not be exeicised so as to deprive the owner of any property of its use for 
the purpose to which it is then lawfully devoted, and any ordinance enacted 
under authority of this chapter shall exempt from the operation thereof any 
building or structure as to which satisfactory proof shall be presented to the 
boaid of adjustments provided for in this chapter that the present or proposed 
situation of such building or structure is reasonably necessary for the conve-
nience or welfare of the public 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 58 Am. Jur. 2d Zoning 
§ 194 et seq. 
C.J.S. — 62 C.J.S. Municipal Corporations 
§ 227 (2). 
A.L.R. — Construction and application of 
statute or ordinance requiring notice as pre-
requisite to granting variance or exception to 
zoning requirement, 38 A.L.R.3d 167. 
Authority of zoning commission to impose, 
as condition of allowance of special zoning ex-
ception, permit, or variance, requirements as 
to highway and traffic changes, 49 A.L.R.3d 
492. 
Zoning board's grant of new application for 
zoning change, variance, or special exception 
after denial of previous application covering 
same property or part thereof, 52 A.L.R 3d 4!M. 
Classification and maintenance of advertis-
ing structures as nonconforming use, 80 
A.L.R.3d 630. 
Building in course of construction as estab-
lishing valid nonconforming use or vested 
right to complete construction for intended use, 
89 A.L.R.3d 1051. 
Key Numbers. — Municipal Corporations 
«=» 601.1; Zoning <s=> 352, 354. 
10-9-7. Board — Number of members — Alternate mem-
bers — Appointment — Term — Removal — Va-
cancies. 
The board of adjustment shall consist of five members, and such alternate 
members as the mayor with the advice and consent of the governing body 
deems appropriate, each to be appointed by the mayor with the advice and 
consent of the governing body for a term of five years but the terms of the 
members of the first board so appointed shall be such that the term of one 
member shall expire each year. Alternate members shall serve in the absence 
of a member or members of the board of adjustment under rules established by 
the governing body. No more than two alternate members shall sit at any 
meeting of the board at one time. Any member may be removed for cause by 
the governing body upon written charges and after public hearing, if such 
public hearing is requested by the member. Vacancies shall be filled for the 
unexpired term of any member or alternate member whose office becomes 
vacant. One member, but not more than one, of the planning commission shall 
be a member of the board of adjustment. 
History: L. 1925, ch. 119, § 7; R.S. 1933 & 
C. 1943,15-8-96; L. 1949, ch. 15, § 1; 1983, ch. 
31, § 1; 1983, ch. 33, § 7. 
Amendment Notes. — This section was 
amended twice in 1983, by chapter 31 and by 
chapter 33. Neither act referred to the other. 
The section is printed incorporating the 
changes made by both amendments. 
The 1983 amendment by chapter 31 inserted 
"and such alternate members as the mayor 
with the advice and consent of the governing 
body deems appropriate" in the first sentence; 
substituted "governing body for a term" in the 
first sentence for "legislative body for a term"; 
inserted the second and third sentences; in-
serted "or alternate member" in the fifth sen-
tence; and substituted "office" for "term" in the 
fifth sentence. 
The 1983 amendment by chapter 33 inserted 
"mayor with the advice and consent of the" in 
the first sentence; added "by the member" in 
the fourth sentence; and made minor changes 
in phraseology. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. — 101A C.J.S. Zoning and Land Plan-
ning §§ 180 to 182. 
Key Numbers. — Zoning «=» 351, 354, 355. 
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10-9-8. Organization of board — Meetings — Duties of 
members — Zoning administrator — Appoint-
ment — Functions — Appeals. 
The board of adjustment shall organize and elect a chairman and adopt 
rules in accordance with the provisions of any ordinance adopted pursuant to 
this article. Meetings of the board shall be held at the call of the chairman and 
at such other times as the board may determine. The chairman, or in his 
absence the acting chairman, may administer oaths and compel the atten-
dance of witnesses. All meetings of the board shall be open to the public. The 
board shall keep minutes of its proceedings, showing the vote of each member 
upon each question, or if absent or failing to vote indicating such fact, and 
shall keep records of its examinations and other official actions; all of which 
shall be immediately filed in the office of the board and shall be a public 
record. 
The governing body may provide for the appointment of a zoning adminis-
trator to decide routine and uncontested matters of the board of adjustment, 
as designated by the board, and pursuant to its established guidelines. Any 
person iig^rieved by a decision of the zoning administrator may appeal the 
decision to the board of adjustment, as provided in this chapter. 
History: L. 1925, ch. 119, § 7; R.S. 1933 & Amendment Notes. — The 1983 amend-
C. 1913, 15-8-97; L. 1983, ch. 30, § 1. ment added the second paragraph. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. — 101A C.J.S. Zoning and Land Plan- est of administrative officer sitting in zoning 
ning §§ 183 to 190. proceeding, 10 A.L.R.3d 694. 
A.L.R. — Disqualification for bias or inter- Key Numbers. — Zoning «» 351-364. 
10-9-9. Appeals to board — Time — Persons entitled — 
Transmission of papers. 
Appeals to the board of adjustment may be taken by any person aggrieved 
or by any officer, department, board or bureau of the municipality affected by 
any decision of the administrative officer. Such appeal shall be taken within a 
reasonable time as provided by the rules of the board by filing with the officer 
from whom the appeal is taken and with the board of adjustment a notice of 
appeal specifying the grounds thereof. The officer from whom the appeal is 
taken shall forthwith transmit to the board of adjustment all the papers con-
stituting the record upon which the action appealed from was taken. 
History: L. 1925, ch. 119, § 7; R.S. 1933 & 
C. 1943, 15-8-98. 
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 58 Am. Jur. 2d Zoning Standing of owner of property adjacent to 
§ 194 et seq. zoned property, but not within territory of 
C.J.S. — 101A C.J.S. Zoning and Land Plan- zoning authority, to attack zoning, 69 A.L.R.3d 
ning §§ 184 to 190. gQ5 
A.L.R. - Right to cross-examination of wit-
 R N u m b e r g . _ Z o n i ^ 4 4 L 
nesses in hearings before administrative J & 
zoning authorities, 27 A.L.R.3d 1304. 
10-9-10. Stay of proceedings pending appeal. 
An appeal stays all proceedings in furtherance of the action appealed from, 
unless the officer from whom the appeal is taken certifies to the board of 
adjustment after the notice of appeal shall have been filed with him that by 
reason of facts stated in the certificate a stay would in his opinion cause 
imminent peril to life or property. In such case proceedings shall not be stayed 
otherwise than by restraining order which may be granted by the board of 
adjustment or by the district court on application and notice and on due cause 
shown. 
History: L. 1925, ch. 119, § 7; R.S. 1933 & 
C. 1943, 15-8-99. 
10-9-11. Notice of hearing of appeal — Right of appear-
ance. 
The board of adjustment shall fix a reasonable time for the hearing of the 
appeal, give public notice thereof as well as due notice to the parties in inter-
est, and shall decide the same within a reasonable time. Upon the hearing any 
party may appear in person or by agent or by attorney. 
History: L. 1925, ch. 119, § 7; R.S. 1933 & 
C. 1943, 15-8-100. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 58 Am. Jur. 2d Zoning statute or ordinance requiring notice as pre-
§§ 221, 222. requisite to granting variance or exception to 
C.J.S. — 101A C.J.S. Zoning and Land Plan- zoning requirement, 38 A.L.R.3d 167. 
ning §§ 187, 188, 215. Key Numbers. — Zoning «=» 442, 443. 
A.L.R. — Construction and application of 
10-9-12. Powers of board on appeal — Granting of and 
showing to be entitled to variance. 
The board of adjustment shall have the following powers: 
(1) to hear and decide appeals where it is alleged that there is error in 
any order, requirement, decision or determination made by the adminis-
trative official in the enforcement of this article or of any ordinance 
adopted pursuant thereto; 
(2) to hear and decide special exceptions to the terms of the ordinance 
upon which such board is required to pass under such ordinance; 
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(3) to authorize upon appeal such variance from the terms of the ordi-
nance as will not be contrary to the public interest, where owing to spe-
cial conditions a literal enforcement of the provisions of the ordinance 
will result in unnecessary hardship; provided, that the spirit of the ordi-
nance shall be observed and substantial justice done. Before any variance 
may be authorized, however, it shall be shown that: 
(a) the variance will not substantially affect the comprehensive 
plan of zoning in the city and that adherence to the strict letter of the 
ordinance will cause difficulties and hardships, the imposition of 
which upon the petitioner is unnecessary in order to carry out the 
general purpose of the plan; 
(b) special circumstances attached to the property covered by the 
application which do not generally apply to the other property in the 
same district; 
(c) that because of said special circumstances, property covered by 
application is deprived of privileges possessed by other properties in 
the same district; and that the granting of the variance is essential to 
the enjoyment of a substantial property right possessed by other 
property in the same district. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
History: L. 1925, ch. 119, § 7; R.S. 1933 & 
C. 1943, 15-8-101; L. 1949, ch. 15, § 1. 
ANALYSIS 
Filling stations. 
Rules and regulations. 
Showing required for variance. 
Variations allowed. 
Filling stations. 
Neither the board nor the district court had 
the power to permit or authorize the use of 
property for a filling station, which use was at 
variance with the use set out in the building 
ordinance. Walton v. Tracy Loan & Trust Co., 
97 Utah 249, 92 P.2d 724 (1939). 
Rules and regulations. 
The board may make such rules and regula-
tions as are reasonably necessary or expedient 
to enable it to carry out administratively its 
functions and duties, but not the duties and 
powers of the commission. Walton v. Tracy 
Loan & Trust Co., 97 Utah 249, 92 P.2d 724 
(1939). 
Showing required for variance. 
In order to justify a variance, this section 
requires that an applicant show at a minimum 
that variance would not substantially affect 
the comprehensive zoning plan; that there are 
special conditions with regard to the property; 
that unnecessary hardship would result if the 
variance was not granted; and that substantial 
property rights enjoyed by other property in 
the area would be denied. Xanthos v. Board of 
Adjustment, 685 P.2d 1032 (Utah 1984). 
What must be shown by an applicant for a 
variance is that the property itself contains 
some special circumstances that relate to the 
hardship complained of and that the granting a 
variance to take this into account would not 
substantially affect the zoning plan; it is not 
enough to show that the property for which the 
variance is requested is different in some way 
from the surrounding property. Xanthos v. 
Board of Adjustment, 685 P.2d 1032 (Utah 
1984). 
Variations allowed. 
Powers of board are limited to minor and 
practical difficulties, to such variations in de-
tail and construction as the inspector himself 
might have allowed, rather than to changes in 
use. Walton v. Tracy Loan & Trust Co., 97 
Utah 249, 92 P.2d 724 (1939). 
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 58 Am. Jur. 2d Zoning A.L.R. — Requirement that zoning vnri-
§ 194 et seq. ances or exceptions be made in accordance with 
C.J.S. — 62 C.J.S. Municipal Corporations comprehensive plan, 40 A.L.R.3d 372. 
§ 227 (10 to 14); 101A C.J.S. Zoning and Land Key Numbers. — Municipal Corporations 
Planning §§ 214, 216. «*=» 601 to 601.3; Zoning «=» 441, 481 et seq. 
10-9-13. Decision on appeal. 
In exercising the above-mentioned powers such board may in conformity 
with the provisions of this article reverse or affirm, wholly or partly, or may 
modify the order, requirement, decision or determination appealed from and 
may make such order, requirement, decision or determination as ought to be 
made, and to that end shall have all the powers of the officer from whom the 
appeal is taken. 
History: L. 1925, ch. 119, § 7; R.S. 1933 & 
C. 1943, 15-8-102. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Powers of board generally. passing on appeals the board may do only that 
Combining this section with preceding one, which the inspector could have done in the first 
it seems that the powers of the board are the instance. Walton v. Tracy Loan & Trust Co., 97 
same as those of the inspector, and that in Utah 249, 92 P.2d 724 (1939). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 82 Am. Jur. 2d Zoning Key Numbers. — Zoning <*=> 445. 
§ 314. 
C.J.S. — 101A C.J.S. Zoning and Land Plan-
ning §§ 189, 211. 
10-9-14. Vote necessary for reversal. 
The concurring vote of three members of the board shall be necessary to 
reverse any order, requirement or determination of any such administrative 
official, or to decide in favor of the appellant on any matter upon which it is 
required to pass under any such ordinance, or to effect any variation in such 
ordinance. 
History: L. 1925, ch. 119, § 7; R.S. 1933 & 
C. 1943, 15-8-103. 
10-9-15. Judicial review of board's decision — Time limita-
tion. 
The city or any person aggrieved by any decision of the board of adjustment 
may have and maintain a plenary action for relief therefrom in any court of 
competent jurisdiction; provided, petition for such relief is presented to the 
court within thirty days after the filing of such decision in the office of the 
board. 
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History: L. 1925, ch. 119, § 7, R.S. 1933 & 
C 1943, 15-8-104; L. 1949, ch. 15, § 1. 
ANALYSIS 
Effect of failure to appeal 
Mandamus 
Stope oi judicial review 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Effect of failure to appeal. 
failure of defendants to appeal from decision 
of board of adjustment denying them right to 
consti uct and operate funeral home in residen-
tial district would not prevent them from set-
ting up defense that ordinance was arbitrary 
and unreasonable, since board of adjustment 
had no authority itself to rezone Provo City v 
Claudin, 91 Utah 60, 63 P 2d 570 (1936) 
Defendants, who were enjoined from operat-
ing funeral home in residential district estab-
lished by ordinance, could not set up defense 
that oidmance was arbitrary and unreasonable 
because district included territory that was 
commuual, where matter was never called to 
attention of proper city commission and statute 
piovidid right of appeal horn decision of such 
commission Provo City v Claudin, 91 Utah 
60 bJ P2d 570 (19 lb) 
Mandamus. 
Mandamus was not available to compel issu-
ance of building permit to applicant who ig-
nored right to relief under this section Crist v 
Mapleton City, 28 Utah 2d 7, 497 P 2d 633 
(1972) 
Scope of judicial review. 
Role of district court in reviewing board of 
adjustment's decision is not to conduct a trial 
de novo, but to determine whether board's ac-
tion was so unreasonable as to be arbitrary and 
capricious, however, in making that determi-
nation, district court may take additional evi-
dence, but it must be relevant to issues that 
were raised and considered by board Xanthos 
v Board of Adjustment, 685 P 2d 1032 (Utah 
1984) 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am Jur . 2d. — 58 Am Jur 2d Zoning 
§ 229 et seq 
C.J S. — 62 C J S Municipal Corporations 
§ 228, 101A C J S Zoning and Land Planning 
§ 265 et seq 
A.L.R. — Purchaser of real property as pre-
cluded from attacking validity of zoning regu-
lation existing at the time of the purchase and 
affecting the purchased property, 17 A L R 3d 
743 
Standing of owner of property adjacent to 
zoned property, but not within territory of 
zoning authority, to attack zoning, 69 A L R 3d 
805 
Standing of zoning board of appeals for simi-
lar body to appeal reversal of its decision, 13 
A L R 4 t h 1130 
Key Numbers. — Municipal Corporations 
«=» 601 3, Zoning «=» 561 et seq 
10-9-16. Repealed. 
Repeals. — Section 10-9-16 (L 1925, ch 
119 U , R S 1933 &C 1943, 15-8-105), relat-
ing to the power of cities to enjoin ordinance 
violations, was repealed by Laws 1983, ch 37, 
§ 5 
10-9-17. Conflict of laws. 
Whenever the regulations made under authority of this article require a 
greater width or size of yards, courts or other open spaces, or require a lower 
height of building or less number of stories, or require a greater percentage of 
lot to be left unoccupied, or impose other higher standards than are required 
in any other btatute or local ordinance or regulation, the provisions of the 
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regulations made under authority of this article shall govern. Wherever the 
provisions of any other statute or local ordinance or regulation require a 
greater width or size of yards, courts or other open spaces, or require a lower 
height of building or a less number of stories, or require a greater percentage 
of lot to be left unoccupied, or impose other higher standards than are re-
quired by the regulations made under authority of this article, the provisions 
of such statute, or local ordinance or regulation shall govern. 
History: L. 1925, ch. 119, § 9; R.S. 1933 & 
C. 1943, 15-8-106. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Conflict between orders of board of adjust- property for a filling station, which use was at 
ment and ordinance. variance with the use set out in the building 
Neither the board nor the district court had ordinance. Walton v. Tracy Loan & Trust Co., 
the power to permit or authorize the use of 97 Utah 249, 92 P.2d 724 (1939). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. — 101A C.J.S. Zoning and Land Plan-
ning § 11. 
Key Numbers. — Zoning «=» 14. 
10-9-18. Fixing compensation of members of board — En-
forcement of zoning regulations — Building in-
spector and permits — Temporary regulations af-
fecting commercial, industrial or residential 
structures. 
The legislative body may: 
(a) fix per diem compensation for the members of the board of adjust-
ment, based on necessary and reasonable expenses and on meetings actu-
ally attended. 
(b) provide for the enforcement of zoning regulations including the 
withholding of building permits. 
(c) create the office of building inspector and appoint a competent per-
son to fill such office. 
(d) fix the compensation of building inspector. 
(e) provide by ordinance that it shall be unlawful to erect, construct, 
reconstruct, alter, or change the use of any building or other structure 
within the municipality covered by such zoning regulations without ob-
taining a building permit from such building inspector. 
(f) provide by ordinance that the building inspector shall not issue any 
permit unless the plans of and for the proposed erection, or construction, 
or use fully conform to all zoning regulations then in effect. 
(g) promulgate by ordinance regulations of a temporary nature prohib-
iting or regulating the erection, construction, reconstruction or alteration 
of any building or structure or to be used for any commercial or industrial 
purpose or the use of land for any such purpose, and establishing the 
minimum front, side and rear yard requirements for the erection and 
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alteration of residential buildings or structures which shall be in effect 
throughout the municipality for a period not to exceed six months. 
History: L. 1925, ch. 119, § 10; R.S. 1933 & 
C. 1943, 15-8-107; L. 1949, ch. 15, § 1. 
ARTICLE 2 
MUNICIPAL PLANNING ENABLING ACT 
10-9-19. Planning commission — Number, terms, appoint-
ment of members — Compensation and expenses 
— Powers of commission — Appointive powers — 
Contractual powers. 
Each city and town may have a planning commission, the number and 
terms of the members, mode of appointment and other details relating to the 
organization and procedure of which shall be determined by the legislative 
body of the municipality. The members of the planning commission shall 
serve without compensation, except for reasonable expenses. The planning 
commission may appoint such employees and staff as it may deem necessary 
for its work, and may contract with city planners and other consultants for 
such services as it requires, provided the expenditures of the commission shall 
be not in excess of such sums as may be appropriated by the legislative body of 
the municipality and/or be placed at the disposal of the planning commission 
through gift or otherwise. 
History: L. 1945, ch. 23, § 1; C. 1943, 
Supp., 15-13-1; L. 1953, ch. 19, § 1. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Note: City Planning Am. Jur. 2d. — 58 Am. Jur. 2d, Zoning § 6. 
— The Architect's Path Through the Legal C.J.S. — 101A C.J.S. Zoning and Land Use 
Thicket, 9 Utah L. Rev. 664. §§ 177 to 179 
Financing Community Impacts: Local Plan-
 K Numbers. - Zoning *> 351 to 353. 
ning Issues in Ski Resort Development, 1985 
Utah L. Rev. 783. 
10-9-20. Functions and duties of commission — Master 
plan — Territory outside city limits. 
It shall be the function and duty of the planning commission, after holding 
public hearings, to make and adopt and certify to the legislative body, a 
master plan for the physical development of the municipality, including any 
areas outside of its boundaries which, in the commission's judgment, bear 
relation to the planning of the municipality. Where the plan involves territory 
outside the boundaries of the city, action shall be taken with the concurrence 
of the county or other municipal legislative body concerned. The master plan, 
with the accompanying maps, plats, charts and descriptive and explanatory 
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matter, shall show the planning commission's recommendations for the said 
physical development, and may include, among other things, the general loca-
tion and extent of streets. The planning commission may from time to time 
amend, extend or add to the plan or carry any part or subject matter into 
greater detail. 
History: L. 1945, ch. 23, § 2; C. 1943, Cross-References. — Zoning plan, 
Supp., 15-13-2. §§ 10-9-4, 10-9-5. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Necessity of referendum. 
Subdivisions. 
Necessity of referendum. 
An ordinance passed by a county council, at 
the request of the planning commission, chang-
ing the classification of certain property from 
residential to commercial use, was an adminis-
trative act and not subject to referendum. Bird 
v. Sorenson, 16 Utah 2d 1,394 P.2d 808 (1964). 
Subdivisions. 
A city ordinance requiring subdividers to 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 58 Am. Jur. 2d Zoning § 27. Key Numbers. — Zoning <§=» 30. 
C.J.S. — 101A C.J.S. Zoning and Land Plan-
ning §§ 39, 178, 179. 
10-9-21. Conformity to master plan required — Effect of 
disapproval — Submission to planning commis-
sion. 
Whenever the legislative authority of the municipality shall have adopted 
the master plan of the municipality or any part thereof, then and thenceforth 
no street, park or other public way, ground, place or space, no public building 
or structure, and no public utility, whether publicly or privately owned, shall 
be constructed or authorized until and unless the location and extent thereof 
shall conform to said plan or shall have been submitted to and approved by 
the planning commission; provided, that in case of disapproval, the commis-
sion shall communicate its reasons to the legislative body and such body by a 
vote of not less than a majority of its entire membership, shall have the power 
to overrule such disapproval, and upon such overruling, the legislative body 
or the appropriate board or officer shall have the power to proceed; provided, 
however, that if the public way, ground, place, space, building, structure or 
utility be one the authorization or financing of which does not, under the law 
governing the same, fall within the province of the legislative body, or other 
body or official of the municipality, then the submission to the planning com-
mission shall be by the board or official having such jurisdiction, and the 
planning commission's disapproval may be overruled by said board by a vote 
dedicate 7 percent of the subdivision's land to 
the city, or pay the equivalent of that value in 
cash for flood control and/or parks and recre-
ation facilities was within the scope of author-
ity and responsibility of the city government in 
the promotion of the health, safety, morals and 
general welfare of the community Call v. City 
of West Jordan, 606 P.2d 217 (Utah 1979). 
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of not less than a majority of its entire membership or by said official. The 
acceptance, widening, removal, extension, relocation, narrowing, vacation, 
abandonment, change of use, acquisition of land for, or sale or lease of any 
street or other public way, ground, place, property, or structure, shall be 
subject to similar submission and approval, and the failure to approve may be 
similarly overruled. The failure of the planning commission to act within 
thirty days from and after the date of official submission to it shall be deemed 
approval, unless a longer period be granted by the legislative body or other 
submitting body, board or official. 
History: L. 1945, ch. 23, § 3; C. 1943, 
Supp., 15-13-3. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C. J.S. — 101A C J.S. Zoning and Land Plan-
ning § 39. 
Key Numbers. — Zoning «=> 30. 
10-9-22. Powers of commission — Reports and recommen-
dations — Entry upon land. 
The planning commission may make reports and recommendations relating 
to the plan and development of the municipality to public officials and agen-
cies, other organizations and citizens. It may recommend to the executive or 
legislative officials programs for public improvements and the financing 
thereof. The planning commission, its members and employees, in the perfor-
mance of its function, may enter upon any land at reasonable times to make 
examinations and surveys and place and maintain necessary monuments and 
marks thereon. In general, the planning commission shall have such powers 
as may be necessary to enable it to perform its functions and promote munici-
pal planning. 
History: L. 1945, ch. 23, § 4; C. 1943, 
Supp., 15-13-4. 
10-9-23. Major street plan — Official map — Effect of mod-
ification. 
From and after the time when the planning commission of any municipality 
shall have adopted a major street plan, the legislative body may establish an 
official map of the whole or any part or parts of the municipality theretofore 
existing and established by law as public streets. Such official map may also 
show the location of the lines of streets on plats of subdivisions which shall 
have been approved by the planning commission. The legislative body may 
make, from time to time, other additions to or modifications of the official map 
by placing thereon the lines of proposed new streets or street extensions, 
widenings, narrowings, or vacations which have been accurately surveyed 
and definitely located; provided, however, that before taking any such action 
the legislative body shall hold a public hearing thereon and provided, further, 
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that such proposed addition to or modification of the official map shall be 
submitted to the planning commission for its approval, and in the event of 
such commission's disapproval, such addition or modification shall require the 
favorable vote of not less than a majority of the entire membership of the 
legislative body. The placing of any street or street lines upon the official map 
shall not in and of itself constitute or be deemed to constitute the opening or 
establishment of any street or the taking or acceptance of any land for street 
purposes. Upon adoption of the ordinance creating the official map, the legis-
lative body shall direct that said ordinance be recorded in the office of the 
county recorder. 
History: L. 1945, ch. 23, § 5; C. 1943, 
Supp., 15-13-5. 
10-9-24. Building permit — Power of board of adjustment 
— Powers of board on appeal — Hearings by 
board. 
For the purpose of preserving the integrity of the official map, the legisla-
tive body may provide by general ordinance that no permit shall be issued for 
any building or structure or part thereof on any land located between the 
mapped lines of any street as shown on the official map. Any such ordinance 
shall provide that the board of adjustment, if the municipality has such a 
board, or, if not, that a board of adjustment created for the purpose in such 
ordinance, shall have the power, upon an appeal filed with it by the owner of 
any such land, to authorize the grant of a permit for a building or structure or 
part thereof within any mapped-street location in any case in which the board 
of adjustment, upon the evidence, finds (a) that the property of the appellant 
of which such mapped-street location forms a part will not yield a reasonable 
return to the owner unless such permit be granted, or (b) that, balancing of 
interest of the municipality in preserving the integrity of the official map and 
the interest of the owner in the use and benefits of the property, the grant of 
such permit is required by consideration of justice and equity. Before taking 
any such action, the board of adjustment shall hold a public hearing thereon. 
In the event that the board of adjustment decides to authorize a building 
permit, it shall have the power to specify the exact location, ground area, 
height, and other details and conditions of extent and character and also the 
duration of the building, structure, or part thereof to be permitted. 
History: L. 1945, ch. 23, § 6; C. 1943, Building permits, authority of city to issue, 
Supp., 15-13-6. § 10-9-18. 
Cross-References. — Appointment, compo- Judicial review of decisions of board, 
Bition and powers of board of adjustment, § 10-9-15. 
§§ 10-9-6, 10-9-7, 10-9-12. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 82 Am. Jur. 2d Zoning A.L.R. — Mandamus to compel zoning offi-
§ 186 et seq. cials to cancel permit granted in violation of 
C.J.S. — 62 C.J.S. Municipal Corporations zoning regulation, 68 A.L.R.3d 166. 
§ 227 (1 to 8); 101A C.J.S. Zoning and Land Key Numbers. — Municipal Corporations 
Planning § 191 et seq. «=» 601 to 601.3; Zoning «=» 371 to 445. 
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10-9-25, Adoption of major street plan — Effect on right to 
file plat — Approval of planning commission as 
condition precedent to filing plat — Regulations 
governing subdivision of land. 
From and after the time when the planning commission of any municipality 
shall have adopted a major street plan and shall have certified the same to the 
legislative body, no plat of a subdivision of land lying within the municipality 
shall be filed or recorded in the county recorder's office until it shall have been 
submitted to and approved by the said planning commission and legislative 
body, and such approval entered in writing on the plat by the secretary of the 
planning commission and clerk of the legislative body, or other designated 
members or employees. No county recorder shall file or record a plat of a 
subdivision without such approval, and any county recorder so doing shall be 
deemed guilty of a misdemeanor. The filing or recording of a plat of a subdivi-
sion without such approval shall be void. In exercising the powers granted to 
it by the act, the planning commission shall prepare regulations governing 
the subdivision of land within the municipality. A public hearing thereon 
shall be held by the legislative body, after which the legislative body may 
adopt said regulations for the municipality. 
History: L. 1945, ch. 23, § 7; C. 1943, 10-9-29 apparently refers to Laws 1945, ch. 23, 
Supp., 15-13-7. which enacted this section and §§ 10-9-19 to 
Meaning of "the act". — The phrase "the 10-9-24 and 10-9-26 to 10-9-30. 
act" appearing in this section and §§ 10-9-27 to 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Approval under council-mayor form of council providing for such approval is in com* 
government. pliance with the approval requirements and re-
Under a council-mayor form of government, cording prerequisites of this section, 
approval of a subdivision plat by the mayor Martindale v. Anderson, 581 P.2d 1022 (Utah 
pursuant to an ordinance adopted by the city 1978). 
10-9-26. Transfer or sale of land without prior prepara-
tion, approval and recording of subdivision plat 
as violation — Exceptions. 
Whoever being the owner or agent of the owner of any land located in a 
subdivision within any area for which a major street plan has been adopted by 
the planning commission and the legislative body, except for land located in a 
recorded subdivision, transfers or sells such land without first preparing a 
subdivision plat and having such plat approved by said planning commission 
and legislative body and recorded in the office of the county recorder shall be 
guilty of a violation of this act for each lot so transferred or sold and the 
description by metes and bounds in the instrument of transfer or other docu-
ment used in the process of selling or transferring shall not exempt the trans-
action from such violation, except that in subdivisions of less than ten lots, 
land may be sold by metes and bounds, without necessity of recording a plat if 
all of the following conditions are met: (a) The subdivision layout shall have 
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been first approved in writing by the planning commission, (b) the subdivision 
is not traversed by the mapped lines of a proposed street as shown on the 
official map or maps of the municipality, and does not require the dedication 
of any land for street or other public purposes, and (c) if the subdivision is 
located in a zoned area, each lot in the subdivision meets the frontage, width 
and area requirements of the zoning ordinance or has been granted a variance 
from such requirements by the board of adjustment. 
History: L. 1945, ch. 23, § 8; C. 1943, tion or may recover the said penalty by civil 
Supp., 15-13-8; L. 1953, ch. 19, § 1; 1983, ch. action." 
37, § 1. Meaning of "this act". — The phrase "this 
Amendment Notes. — The 1983 amend- act" first appeared in this section as amended 
ment substituted "violation of this act" for by Laws 1983, ch. 87, § 1. That act (Laws 1945, 
"misdemeanor"; substituted "such violation"
 ch# 23) also amended §§ 10-9-30, 17-27-21 and 
for "such penalties"; and deleted the last sen- i7 .27-23. The intended reference, however, ap-
tence which read: Said municipality may en-
 to b e to t h i g c h t e r 
join such transferor sale by action for mjunc-
10-9-27. Designation of municipal planning commission — 
County or regional planning commission — Ex-
penses of designated commission. 
In any municipality other than cities of the first or second class, located in a 
county or region which has a planning commission, the legislative body of said 
municipality may designate such county or regional planning commission as 
the municipal planning commission of said municipality. In acting as the 
planning commission of the municipality, the designated county or regional 
planning commission shall follow the procedure specified by the provisions of 
this act and other laws relating to municipal planning commissions. Any 
municipality so designating a county or regional commission as its planning 
commission is hereby authorized to and shall pay to the designated planning 
commission that portion of the expenses of the designated commission which 
is properly chargeable to the said planning service rendered to and for the 
said municipality. 
History: L. 1945, ch. 23, § 9; C. 1943, Meaning of "this act". — See the note un-
Supp., 15-13-9. der this heading following § 10-9-25. 
10-9-28. Short title — Definitions. 
This act shall be known as "The Municipal Planning Enabling Act." For the 
purpose of this act certain terms are defined as provided in this section. When-
ever appropriate the singular includes the plural and the plural the singular. 
The term "street" includes streets, highways, avenues, boulevards, parkways, 
roads, lanes, walks, alleys, viaducts, subways, tunnels, bridges, public ease-
ments and rights of way and other ways. The term "subdivision" means the 
division of a tract or parcel of land into three or more parts for the purpose, 
whether immediate or future, of sale or of building development. 
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History: L. 1945, ch. 23, § 10; C. 1943, Meaning of "this act". — See the note un-
Supp., 15-13-10; L. 1953, ch. 19, § 1. der this heading following § 10-9-25. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Note, Urban Plan- Past, Present and Future, 1971 Utah L. Rev. 
ning and Development — Race and Poverty — 46. 
10-9-29. Severability clause — Jurisdiction of commission 
over public property. 
If any section, subsection, sentence, clause or phrase of this act is for any 
reason held to be unconstitutional, such decision shall not affect the validity 
of the remaining portion of the act. Provided, that nothing contained in this 
act shall be construed as giving the planning commission or the legislative 
body jurisdiction over properties owned by the state of Utah or the United 
States Government. 
History: L. 1945, ch. 23, § 11; C. 1943, Meaning of "this act". — See the note un-
Supp., 15-13-11. der this heading following § 10-9-25. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. — 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 94. 
Key Numbers. — Statutes *=» 64(4). 
10-9-30, Violation of chapter or ordinance punishable as 
misdemeanor — Remedies of municipality and 
owners of real estate. 
Violation of any of the provisions of Chapter 9, Title 10, or of any adopted 
municipal zoning, subdivision, official map, or major street plan ordinance, 
shall upon conviction be punishable as a Class C misdemeanor. Said munici-
pality, or any owner of real estate within the municipality in which such 
violation occurs, may, in addition to other remedies provided by law, institute 
injunctions, mandamus, abatement or any other appropriate action or actions, 
proceeding or proceedings to prevent, enjoin, abate or remove the unlawful 
building, use, or act. 
History: L. 1945, ch. 23, § 12; C. 1943, 
Supp., 15-13-12; L. 1983, ch. 37, § 2. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1983 amend-
ment substituted "Chapter 9, Title 10, or of 
any adopted municipal zoning, subdivision, of-
ficial map, or major street plan ordinance" for 
"this act" in the first sentence; inserted "Class 
C" in the first sentence; substituted "munici-
pality in which such violation occurs" for "dis-
trict in which such building, structure or land 
is situated" in the second sentence; substituted 
"the unlawful building, use, or act" for "such 
unlawful erection, construction, reconstruc-
tion, alteration, maintenance or use" in the 
second sentence. 
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 82 Am. Jur. 2d Zoning Key Numbers. — Zoning «^> 761 et seq. 
§§ 242 to 253. 
C.J.S. — 101A C.J.S. Zoning and Land Plan-
ning §§ 355 to 361. 
CHAPTER 10 
CITIES OF FIRST AND SECOND CLASS 
Article 1 Article 3 
Municipal Wards Civil Service Commission 
Section Section 
10-10-1. Division of city into wards — Num- 10-10-9 to 10-10-22. Repealed, 
ber and boundaries. 
Article 4 
Uniform Municipal Fiscal Procedures 
Budget System Act 
10-10-2 to 10-10-8. Repealed. 10-10-23 to 10-10-75. Repealed. 
ARTICLE 1 
MUNICIPAL WARDS 
10-10-1. Division of city into wards — Number and bound-
aries. 
All cities of the first class shall be divided into six municipal wards and all 
cities of the second class shall be divided into five municipal wards, the bound-
aries of which shall be prescribed by ordinance and shall not be changed 
oftener than once in five years; such wards shall be as nearly as may be of 
equal population and in compact form. 
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 181; C.L. 
1917, § 532; L. 1939, ch. 26, § 1; R.S. 1933 & 
C. 1943, 15-9-1. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Redistricting. upon request, as for example, upon the request 
This section provides for redistricting, the of the board of education. Olsen v. Merrill, 78 
city commission being empowered to do so Utah 453, 5 P.2d 226 (1931). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. — 62 C.J.S. Municipal Corporations Key Numbers. — Municipal Corporations 
§§ 81, 82. *» 40. 
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Chapter 2 
ADMINISTRATION AND PROCEDURES 
Sections: 
11-2-1 Hearings - Notice and Procedure 
11-2-2 Amendment - Procedure 
11-2-3 Variances - Procedure 
11-2-4 Conditional Use Permit - Procedure 
11-2-5 Appeals 
11-2-6 Annexed Territory - Zoning 
11-2-1 HEARINGS - NOTICE AND PROCEDURE, Notices of Public 
Hearings required by this Title before the Board of Adjustment, 
the Planning Commission, or the City Council shall be given at 
least fifteen (15) calendar days before the Hearing in a manner 
hereinafter set forth. Such notice shall state the time and place 
of such hearings and shall include a general explanation of the 
matter to be considered and a general description of the area 
affected, 
A. If the matter is before the Board of Adjustment, the 
Planning Commission, or the City Council, the notice shall 
be published at least once in a newspaper of general cir-
culation within Clearfield City, 
B. If the matter is before the Board of Adjustment or the 
Planning Commission, The City shall, in addition to the above 
notice by publication, mail or otherwise deliver a notice to 
each owner of property within a radius of three hundred (300) 
feet of the exterior boundaries of the subject property, in-
cluding any property owner(s) outside the corporate limits of 
Clearfield City. Such notice shall be headed "NOTICE OF 
PUBLIC HEARING," and shall briefly describe the property 
involved and the changes, permits, or variances requested. 
It shall also state the place, date and time of the hearing. 
The list of property owners within three hundred (300) feet 
shall be taken from the latest assessment rolls prepared by 
the County Assessor of Davis County. 
11-2-2 AMENDMENT - PROCEDURE. This Zoning Title, including 
ne map, may be amended by the City Council after said amendments 
shall have first been submitted for recommendation to the Planning 
Commission, The recommendation of the Planning Commission shall be 
submitted to the City Council within thirty (30) days after the 
presentation of the rezoning proposal or petition for amendment at a 
regularly scheduled Planning Commission Meeting. 
For the purpose of establishing and maintaining sound, stable, 
and desirable development within the City, it is declared to be the 
public policy that amendments shall not be made to the Zoning Title, 
and Map, except to promote more fully the objectives and purposes 
of this Title or to correct manifest errors. Any person seeking 
an amendment to the Planning and Zoning Title or Map shall submit 
to the Building and Zoning Department a written petition containing 
the following information: 
A. Designation of the specific zone change or Title 
amendment desired. 
B. The reason and justification for such zone change or Title 
amendment, and a statement setting forth the manner in which 
a proposed amendment or Zone would further promote the 
objectives and purposes of the Zoning Title. 
C. A complete and accurate legal description of the area 
proposed to be rezoned, or a draft of the proposed Title 
amendment. 
D. An accurate plat, drawn to scale, showing all areas to be 
included within the proposed rezoning, designating the present 
zoning of the property subject of the petition, and properties 
immediately adjacent thereto. 
E. A list of all property owners within a radius of three 
hundred (300) feet of the boundaries of the property to be 
rezoned, as taken from the latest assessment rolls prepared 
by the County Assessor of Davis County. 
F. A filing fee of $50.00. 
Upon receipt of petition by the Building and Zoning Department, 
a copy shall be submitted to the office of the City Recorder for 
filing, and a copy with all accompanying materials shall be fore-
warded to the City Planning Commission for their consideration of 
the request. The Planning Commission shall hold a public hearing 
in accordance with the provisions of Section 11-2-1 of this Chapter 
before submitting their recommendations to the City Council. 
Before recommending an amendment to this Title, it must be 
shown that such amendment is necessary, is in the interest of the 
public, and is in harmony with objectives and purposes of this 
Title. Failure on the part of the Planning Commission to make 
recommendation to the City Council within thirty (30) days after 
hearing the petition shall be deemed to constitute approval of 
such proposed amendments. 
The fee provided herein shall not be returnable and shall be 
applied to the General Fund to offset the cost of legal publicationsr 
notification of property owners, and the staff time involved in 
researching the appropriateness of said request and its effect upon 
the general welfare of the community. 
11-2-3 VARIANCES - PROCEDURE. The Board of Adjustment may 
authorize, upon appeal, such variances from the terms of this Title 
as will not be contrary to the public interest, where owing to the 
special conditions the literal enforcement of the provisions of 
this Title will result in unnecessary hardship; provided, that the 
spirit of the Ordinance shall be observed and substantial justice 
done. Before any variance may be authorized however, it shall be 
shown that: 
A. The variance will not substantially affect the comprehensive 
plan of zoning in the City and that adherence to the strict 
letter of the Ordinance will cause difficulties and hardships, 
the imposition of which upon the petitioner is unnecessary in 
order to carry out the general purpose of the plan. 
B. Special circumstances attached to the property covered by 
the application which do not generally apply to other pro-
perties in the same district. 
C. That because of special circumstances, property covered 
by this application is deprived of privileges possessed by 
other properties in the same district; and that the granting 
of the variance is essential to the enjoyment of a substantial 
property right possessed by other property in the same district. 
Applications for variance shall be filed with the Secretary 
of the Board of Adjustment in the office of the Building and Zoning 
Department. Said application shall contain the following information 
A. A description of the requested variance, togther with a 
designation of that Ordinance Provision from which relief is 
being requested. 
B. An accurate plot plan, if appropriate, indicating the 
manner in which the variance will be applied and its effect 
upon adjacent properties. 
C. A filing fee of $50.00. 
D. A list of property owners within three hundred (300) feet 
of any property subject of the requested variance, contained 
within the latest assessment rolls prepared by the County 
Assessor of Davis County. 
Upon receipt of application by the Secretary of the Board of 
Adjustment, a copy shall be submitted to the office of the City 
Recorder for filing, and a copy with all accompanying materials 
shall be forwarded to the Board of Adjustment for their action upon 
the request. The Board of Adjustment shall hold a public hearing 
in accordance with procedures set forth in Section 11-2-1 of this 
Chapter. 
1 I-4.-*t. U U H U i I i U H M L U J C J * 
11-2-4.1: PURPOSE AND INTENT. The purpose and intent of conditional uses 
is to allow in certain areas compatible integration of uses which 
are related to the permitted uses of the zone, but which may be suitable and 
desirable only in certain locations in that zone due to conditions and circum-
stances peculiar to that location and/or upon certain conditions which make 
the uses suitable and/or only if such uses are designed, laid out, and const-
ructed on the proposed site in a particular manner. 
11-2-4.2: CONDITIONAL USE PERMIT. A Conditional Use Permit shall be required 
for all uses listed as conditional uses in the zone regulations. 
A Conditional Use Permit may be revoked by the City Council after review and 
recommendation by the Planning Commission, upon failure to comply with the 
conditions imposed with the original approval of the permit. 
11-2-4.3: REVIEW PROCEDURE. 
A. Application for a Conditional Use Permit shall be made to the 
City Planning Commission accompanied by a filing of $25.00 which fee shall be 
non-refundable. 
B. Detailed location, site and building plans, the name and address 
of all property owners within a three-hundred (300) foot radius of boundaries 
of the property shall accompany the complete application on a form provided by 
the City. 
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C. All pertinent information shall be mailed to all property 
owners within the three-hundred (300) foot radius of the subject property before 
review by the Planning Commission. The application together with all pertinent 
information will be considered by the Planning Commission at its next regularly 
scheduled meeting. 
D. The Planning Commission may call a specific Public Hearing on 
any application after adequate notice if it is deemed in the public interest, 
in which case, the Planning Commission shall take action on the application 
by the second meeting of the Planning Commission, after the application filing 
date. 
11-2-4.4: DETERMINATION. The Planning Commission may deny or permit a 
c o^n d i t ijona 1 _i£S e^  to_ be^l oca ted jy ijthi n ADylzpn^ J. n jvfrich the particular 
conditional^iseTis.. permlii3Z.I Irilauthor^^ .use* the Planning 
Commission^_shalj impose juch requirements and conditions necessary for the 
P r Qt£ctiQn_o.f^adj.ac£nt>Jp r n pp r f fe sT, and. ..pi i hllc^wal f are^ 
11-2-4.5: BASIS FOR ISSUANCE OF CONDITIONAL USE PERMIT. The Planning Commission 
shall not authorize a Conditional Use Permit unless evidence is 
presented to establish: 
A. That thp prnpnspri use, ,nf •tbg,.paxXiaila.r..Tn^tiAaA^,a&C^^4ry 
Or desirable to proviriP a ^Prvire nr far-Mity whirh will rnnfrihiitP tn fhp 
general well-being of the community, and; 
An Ordinance to Amend the Revised Ordinances of Clearfield City, 11-2-4-3.B, 
Adopted by the City Council, September 22, 1981. 
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An Ordinance Amending the Revised Ordinances of Clearfield City, 11-2-4-3.C, 
Adopted by the City Council, September 22, 1981. 
D. That such use will not, under the circumstances of the 
particular case and the conditions imposed, be detrimental 
to the health, safety and general welfare of persons or 
injurious to property and improvements in the community, 
but will be compatible with and complimentary to the existin.q 
surrounding uses, buildings and structures when considering 
but not limited to, effect on adjacent property values, traffic, 
psf-hpHcs. onllnfion, parking, landscaping, location of 
s t r n r f n r p nn p a r r p l a n d fiipns. 
C. That the proposed use will comply with the regulations 
and conditions specified in this Ordinance for such use, and 
D. That the proposed use conforms to the goals, policies, 
intent and governing principles of the Clearfield City Master 
Plan, 
11-2-4-6. CONDITIONS WHICH MAY BE IMPOSED INCIDENT TO GRANTING 
OF A CONDITIONAL USE PERMIT. Where this Title contains 
specific requirements which must be met as an incident of Conditional 
Use Permit issuance, all such conditions must be met or adequate 
assurance of compliance must be given to the local jurisdiction 
prior to the issuance of such permit• 
Where no specific requirements are contained in this Title 
for the issuance of a Conditional Use Permit, one or more of the 
following requirements or limitations may be imposed by the Plannning 
Commission as an incident to issuance of such permit. 
A. Landscaping to insure compatibility with the intended 
characteristics of the district as outlined in this Ordinance. 
B. Increased setback and side yard distances from lot lines 
may be necessary to insure the public safety and to insure 
compatibility with the intended characteristics of the district 
as outlined in this Title. 
C. The screening of yards or other areas as protection from 
obnoxious land uses and activities. 
D. The removal of structures, debris, or plant life, incompati-
ble with the intended characteristics of the district outlined 
in this Ordinance. 
E. The relocation, covering or fencing of irrigation ditches, 
drainage channels, and similar potential attractive nuisances 
as determined by the Planning Commission. 
F. The relocation of proposed or existing structures as 
necessary to provide for future streets on the major street plan 
of the local jurisdiction, adequate sight distances for general 
safety, ground water control, or similar problems, 
G. Construction of water mains, sewer mains, and drainage 
facilities serving the proposed use, in sizes necessary to 
protect existing utility users in the district and to provide 
for an orderly development of land in the local jurisdiction. 
H. The location, arrangement, and dimensions of truck loading 
and unloading facilities• 
I. The number, location, color, size, height, lighting, and 
landscaping of outdoor advertising signs and structures in 
relation to the creation of traffic hazards and"appearance 
and harmony with adjacent development. 
J. The location, height, and materials of walls, fences, 
hedges, and screen plantings to insure harmony with adjacent 
development, or to conceal storage areas, utility installations, 
or other unsightly development. 
K. The planting of ground cover or other surfacing to 
prevent dust and erosion. 
L. The retention of existing healthy trees and vegetation. 
M. Construction of curbs, gutters, drainage culverts, 
sidewalks, streets, fire hydrants, and street lighting which 
serve the property in question and which may compensate in 
part or in whole for possible adverse impacts to the district 
from the proposed conditional use. 
N. Restructuring of the land and planting of the same as 
directed by the Planning Commission when the conditional use 
involves cutting and/or filling the land and where such land 
would be adversely affected if not restructured. 
0. Time limits on the validity of the Conditional Use Permit. 
P. A bond or other valuable assurance in favor of the local 
jurisdiction in an amount to be determined by the governing 
body. The amount of said bond or other valuable assurance shall 
not exceed the amount calculated by the developer's engineer 
and approved by the local engineer as necessary to assure 
compliance with all conditions. 
Q. Specific short and long range plans of development. 
R. Certification obtained and furnished by the applicant 
indicating that the proposed conditional u£e will meet and 
comply with standards set by the Environmental Protection 
Agency and by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, 
S. Limitations and/or restrictions on the use and/or location 
of uses due to special site conditions including but not 
limited to geologically hazardous areas; flood plains; 
fault zones; land slide areas; and sensitive areas due to 
soil capabilities, wildlife and plant life. 
T. Population density and intensity of land uses may be 
limited where land capability and/or vicinity relationships 
make it appropriate to do so to protect health, safety and 
welfare. 
U. Provision for or construction of recreational facilities 
necessary to satisfy needs of the conditional use. 
V. Finish floor elevations and grading plans to prevent or 
minimize water damage from flood levels as determined by 
hydrology studies. 
W. A public hearing when deemed by the Planning Commission 
to be in the public interest. However, in the following 
instances the holding of a public hearing shall be mandatory: 
(1) The Planning Commission determines that existing 
streets and thoroughfares are not suitable and adequate 
to carry anticipated traffic, and increased densities 
resulting from the proposed use may generate traffic in 
such amounts as to overload the street network outside 
the district. 
(2) The Planning Commission determines that increases 
in miscellaneous traffic, light, odor, and environmental 
pollution generated by the proposed use may significantly 
change the intended characteristics of the district as 
outlined in this Ordinance. 
(3) The Planning Commission determines that the archi-
tectural design of the proposed use varies significantly 
from the architectural characteristics of the district 
(as outlined in this Ordinance) in which such use is 
proposed. 
(4) There are no specific requirements for the 
conditional use in this Ordinance. 
X. Any other reasonable condition which will serve to 
maintain the intended characteristics of a district as outlined 
in this Ordinance and to compensate for possible adverse 
impacts to the district from the proposed conditional use. 
11-2-4-7. APPEAL. Any person shall have the right to appeal 
to the City Council any decision rendered by the Planning Commission 
by filing, in writing and in triplicate, the reasons for said 
appeal with said City Council at any regular meeting thereof within 
fifteen (15) days following the date upon which the decision from 
which appeal is being taken is made by the Planning Commission. 
A. Notification of Planning Commission. The City Council 
shall notify the Planning Commission of the date of said 
review in writing at least seven (7) days preceeding said 
date set for hearing so that said Planning Commission may 
prepare the record for said hearing. 
B. Determination of City Council. The City Council, after 
proper review of the decision of the Planning Commission, may 
affirm, reverse, alter or remand for further review and con-
sideration any action taken by said Planning Commission and 
shall make such decision within thirty (30) days of the hearing 
of the appeal. 
11-2-4-8. BUILDING PERMIT. Following the issuance of a 
Conditional Use Permit, the Building Inspector shall review the 
permit and the conditions attached. Based on this review and 
compliance with any other items that might develop in the pursuance 
of his duties, the Building Inspector any approve an application 
for a Building Permit and shall insure that development is undertaken 
and completed in compliance with said Conditional Use Permit and 
Building Permit. 
11-2-4-9. EXPIRATION. Unless there is substantial action 
under a Conditional Use Permit within a period of one year of its 
issuance, the Conditional Use Permit shall expire. The Planning 
Commission may grant a single extension not to exceed six months 
under exceptional circumstances. 
11-2-4-10. MODIFICATION OR REVOCATION OF CONDITIONAL USE PERMITS. 
The City Council, on its own motion or by recommendation of 
the Planning Commission, may hold a hearing upon the question of 
modification or revocation of a Conditional Use Permite granted under 
or pursuant to the provisions of this section. Notice of said hear-
ing shall be made in a manner prescribed by Section 11-2-1 of this 
Chapter. A Conditional Use Permit may be modified or revoked if the 
City Council finds one or more of the following: 
1. That the use is detrimental to the public health, safety, 
or welfare or is a nuisance. 
o That the use permit was obtained by fraud. 
3. That the use for which the permit was granted is not 
being exercised. 
4. That the use for which the use permit was granted has 
ceased or has been suspended for six (6) months. 
5. That the conditions imposed upon said use permit have 
not been complied with. 
6. That there is a violation of other laws or ordinances 
of the City which have a direct bearing upon the conduct of 
the conditional use and/or its compatability with other 
surrounding uses. 
11-2-5 APPEALS. Appeals from actions or decisions of 
Clearfield City Officers, Officials, or Advisory Agencies may be 
made in conformance with the following provisions: 
A. Appeals to the Board of Adjustment. Appeals to the Board 
of Adjustment may be taken by any person aggrieved or by any 
Officer, Department, Board of Bureau of Municipality affected 
by any decision by the Administrative Officer. Such appeal 
shall be taken within fifteen (15) days of said action or 
decision by filing a Notice of Appeal with the Officer from 
whom the appeal is taken or with the Board of Adjustment. 
Said Notice of Appeal shall specify the grounds of the 
appeal and circumstances related thereto. The Officer from 
whom the appeal was taken shall forthwith transmit to the 
Board of Adjustment all papers constituting the record upon 
which the action appealed from was taken. 
(Ref. Appeals to Board 10-9-9 U.C.A., 1953) 
An appeal stays all proceedings in furtherance of the action 
appealed from unless the Officer from whom the appeal is taken 
certifies to the Board of Adjustment after the Notice of Appeal 
shall have been filed with him that by reason of facts stated 
in the Certificate a stay would, in his opinion, cause imminent 
peril to life or property. In such case, proceedings shall not 
be stayed otherwise than by restraining order which may be 
granted by the Board of Adjustment or by the District Court 
on application and no-cice and on due cause shown. 
(Ref. Stay of Proceedings pending appeal 10-9-10 
U.C.A., 1953) 
The Board of Adjustment shall set a public hearing on the 
appeal in accordance with the provisions of Section 11-2-1 
of this Chapter. Upon the hearing, any party may appear in 
person or by agent or by attorney. 
In exercising its powers, the Board of Adjustment may reverse 
or affirm, wholly or partly or may modify the order requirement, 
decision or determination appealed from and may make such order, 
requirement, decision or determination as ought to be made, and 
to that end shall have all of the powers of the officer from 
whom the appeal is taken. The concurring vote of three (3) 
members of the Board shall be necessary to reverse any 
order, requirement or determination of any such administrative 
official, or to decide in favor of the appellant on any matter 
upon which it is required to pass under any such ordinance, 
or to affect any variation in such Ordinance• 
(Ref. Decision on appeal - vote necessary for reversal 
10-9-13 and 10-9-14, U.C.A., 1953) 
B. Appeals to the City Council. Appeals to the City Council 
may be taken by any person 'aggrieved or affected by any 
decision of the City Planning Commission. Such an appeal may 
be made within fifteen (15) days of the time of the decision of 
the said Planning Commission by filing a notice of appeal with 
the office of the City Recorder. The City Recorder shall then 
forthwith transmit to the City Council all of the papers and 
records related to the action from which the appeal is taken. 
The Clearfield City Council shall set a public hearing on the 
appeal in accordance with the provisions of Section 11-2-1 of 
this Chapter. All persons having any interest in the appeal 
may appear in person or be represented at the hearing. 
The City Council may confirm or overrule the decision of the 
Planning Commission, or may ma^o au^ hr^ inehdrae-n-ts to thg. 
decision as it may de^ui—appropriate. 
C. Judig>arr ^ Appeal. Any person aggrieved by or affected by 
any decision of the Board of Adjustment or the City Council 
may have and maintain a plenary action for relief therefrom 
in any court of competent jurisdiction; provided, petition 
for such relief is presented to the Court within thirty (30) 
days after the filing of such decision in the office of the 
Board of Adjustment or with the City Recorder. 
(Ref. Judicial Review of Board's Decision 10-9-15, 
U.C.A., 1953) 
11-2-6 ANNEXED i^u^liuxxi - ZUNJLIMU. ^ny property which, for 
any reason is not designated on the official zoning map as being 
classified in any of the zones established hereby, or any property 
in the process of annexation, or annexed to or consolidated to the 
City of Clearfield subsequent to the effective date of this Chapter, 
shall be deemed to be classified comparably to existing County 
Zoning until the same shall have been otherwise classified in the 
manner set forth in Section 11-2-2 of this Chapter subsequent to 
annexation. 
In order to insure due process and to protect the rights of 
the citizens of Clearfield City, property shall not be reclassified 
to a zone of more intense use concurrently with or prior to 
completion of annexation proceedings, unless otherwise requested 
by the property owner(s) nor shall any Officer or Official of 
Clearfield City utilize reclassification committments as a medium 
of bargaining for the annexation of property in Clearfield City. 
Chapter 12 
P-0 PROFESSIONAL OFFICE ZONE 
Sections: 
11-12-1 Purpose and Objectives 
11-12-2 Permitted Uses 
11-12-3 Lot Area 
11-12-4 Lot Width 
11-12-5 Lot Frontage 
11-12-6 Prior Created Lots 
11-12-7 Lot Area Per Dwelling 
11-12-3 Yard Requirements 
11-12-9 Projections into Yard 
11-12-10 Building Height 
11-12-11 Distance Between Buildings 
11-12-12 Permissible Lot Coverage 
11-12-13 Parking, Loading and Access 
11-12-14 Site Plan Approval 
11-12-15 Other Requirements 
11-12-1 PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVES. The Professional Office 
(P-O) Zone is established to provide areas in close proximity to 
the Central Business District, hospitals, business areas, and 
along arterials or major collector streets which will accommodate 
mixed multi-family residential uses and offices or laboratories 
for professional persons and related uses* This zone should not 
be established in a "strip" zoning manner along major streets, but 
should be concentrated to provide easy accessibility to the public. 
The zone is intended to provide availability of professional services 
conveniently to all neighborhoods in the community. 
Uses permitted in the P-0 Zone would typically include medium 
density apartments, offices for doctors, dentists, accountants, 
and other similar professions, medical, and dental laboratories, 
and pharmacies. 
11-12-2 PERMITTED USES, Those uses or categories of uses 
as listed herein, and no others, are permitted in the P-0 Zone. 
All uses listed herein are listed by number as designated in 
the Standard Land Use Code published and maintained by the Building 
and Zoning Department. Specific uses are identified by a four-
digit number in which all digits are whole numbers. Classes or 
groupings of such uses permitted in the zone are identified by a 
four-digit number in which the last one or two digits are zeros. 
All such categories listed herein, and all specific uses contained 
within them in the Standard Land Use Code, will be permitted in the 




A. Permitted Principal Uses, The following principal 
uses and structures, and no others, are permitted in the 
P-0 Zone : 
USE NO. USE CLASSFICIATIONS 
1141 Apartment (Low-rise, detached) (constructed 
to the standards of R-3 Zone provisions) 
4 800 Utilities (Lines and rights-of-way only) 
(Except 4850) 
6311 Advertising Services (Office only) 
6320 Consumer Credit Services 
63 30 Duplicating, Stenographic and Office Services 
6340 Dwelling, Janitorial and Other Building 
Services (Office only) 
6350 News Syndicate Services (Office Only) 
6360 Employment Services 
6390 Miscellaneous Business Services (Office only) 
6500 Professional Services (Office only - no 
lodging or bed facilities) 
6710 Executive, Legislative, and Judicial Offices 
6900 Miscelleneous Service Organizations (Office 
only) 
5912 Prescription Pharmacy (Intended for the 
convenience of permitted establishments 
and/or clients thereof, provided that no 
such business occupies more than 15 percent 
of the total floor area of the building 
in which it is located and has no separate 
street entrance.) 
B. Permitted Accessory Uses. Accessory uses and structures 
are permitted in the P-0 Zone, provided they are incidental 
to, and do not substantially alter the character of the 
permitted principal use or structure. Such permitted accessory 
uses and structures include, but are not limited to, the 
following: 
1. Accessory buildings such as garages, carports, 
greenhouses, bath houses, gardening shed, recreation 
rooms, and similar structures which are customarily 
used in conjection with and are incidental to 
principal uses and structures allowed in the P-0 Zone. 
2* Swimming pools and incidental bath houses, 
3. Storage of materials used for the construction of a 
building including a temporary contractor's office 
and/or tool shed, provided that such uses are on the 
building site or immediately adjacent thereto, and 
provided that such use shall be for only the period of 
construction and thirty (30) days thereafter. 
4. Household pets in residential dwelling units, provided 
there shall be no more than one (1) pet over the age 
of four (4) months per dwelling unit* Nothing herein 
shall be construed as authorizing the keeping of any 
animals capable of inflicting harm or discomfort or 
endangering the health and safety of any person or 
property. 
C. Conditional Uses. The following uses and structures are 
permitted in the P-0 Zone only after a Conditional Use Permit 
has been approved by the Planning Commission, and subject to 
the terms and conditions thereof. 
USE NO. USE CLASSIFICATION 
1210 Rooming and Boarding Houses 
1211 Baching Apartments (in structures devoted 
exclusively to that use) (Six (6) tenants 
per unit maximum to standards of R-4 Zone., 
4700 Communications 
4800 Utilities (except lines and rights-of-way) 
6111 Banking and Related Functions 
6513 Hospitals 
6516 Sanitariums, ^ Convalescent, and Rest Home 
Services "* " " * w*-^ 
11-12-3 LOT AREA. The minimum lot area of any lot or parcel 
of land m the P-0 Zone shall be seven thousand (7,000) square feet. 
11-12-4 LOT WIDTH. Each lot or parcel of land in the P-0 
Zone shall have a width of not less than seventy (70) feet. 
11-12-5 LOT FRONTAGE. Each lot or parcel of land in the 
P-0 Zone shall abut a public street for a minimum distance of 
fifty (50) feet, on a line parallel to the center line of a street 
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STATE'S TOP COURTS OVERRULE 
ZONING APPEALS PROCEDURES 
With a quick one-two punch, the state's top courts 
last month demolished the appeals process used by many 
Utah cities in administration of their zoning 
ordinances. 
In decisions handed down within ten days of each 
other, the Utah Supreme Court and the Utah Court of 
Appeals said that boards of adjustment, not city 
councils, are the bodies authorized by state law to 
consider appeals of all zoning actions undertaken by 
the Planning Commission. 
Zoning ordinances in many Utah cities empower the 
Planning Commission to act on such matters as granting 
conditional use permits and approving site plans. 
Many of these same ordinances allow persons aggrieved 
by a zoning action of the Planning Commission to 
appeal to the City Council. But the two recent state 
court rulings have invalidated the appeals procedure. 
In a ruling in Scherbel v. Salt Lake City, handed 
down by the Utah Supreme Court on May 3, the Court 
addressed the actions of the city Planning Commission 
and Landmarks Committee which were appealed to the 
City Councfl. The Court wrote, "We disagree with the 
trial court's analysis permitting the City Council to 
hear appeals of Planning Commission decisions. The 
Optional Forms of Municipal Government Act ... 
prohibits the City Council from hearing such appeals 
because of the separation of powers doctrine. ... (W)e 
hold that the ^ authority to resolve zoning disputes is 
properly an executive function rather than a 
legislative one. ... We ... hold that the board of 
adjustment is the proper body to hear zoning appeals 
from the planning commission under the council-mayor 
form of government* 
Ten days later, in Davis County v. Clearfield City, 
the Utah Court of Appeals specifically addressed an 
appeal of a conditional use permit. The Appeals Court 
wrote, "...(Clearfield) cit/s ordinance is 
inconsistent with generally applicable state law, at 
least insofar as it vests in the city council, rather 
than a board of adjustment, the final word on 
applications for conditional use permits. In that 
sense, the ordinance is unconstitutional under the 
supremacy clause contained in Utah Constitution Art 
XI, Par. 5." 
The Appeals Court continued, "... the Clearfield City 
ordinance ... fails to provide for final review of 
zoning matters by a board of adjustment as required by 
Par. 10-9-15 (Utah State Code) and endeavors to vest 
the City Council with the final determination of 
conditional use permits. A legislative body may act 
as a board of appeals only when the creation of a 
board of adjustment is not statutorily mandated." 
Many city zoning ordinances in Utah, and elsewhere, 
have adopted zoning procedures that were not 
contemplated in the original Standard Zoning Enabling 
Act, written in 1925. Such items as conditional use 
permits, site plans, historic landmarks committees, 
and many others, have evolved since the original Act 
was developed. 
As these new zoning techniques gained greater 
acceptance, planners and city councils generally felt 
more comfortable having Planning Commissions and City 
Councils, bodies which dealt with planning issues 
regularly, conduct the review and approval 
Some states have changed the Zoning Enabling Act to 
speciGcally authorize these new procedures. But many 
others simply acted under the rule that if certain 
actions are not specifically prohibited in the state 
law, then they are permissible. 
As challenges have arisen in other states over the 
issuance of conditional use permits and site plan 
approvals, various state courts have split on the 
allowable procedures. Some upheld the new techniques, 
while others overturned them. The Utah courts, until 
last month, had been silent on the issue. 
In the two recent Utah rulings, the Courts apparently 
have no problem with conditional use permits, site 
plan approval procedures, or any of the other "new" 
techniques employed in zoning ordinances today. Their 
main objection is to the appeals process employed in 
those ordinances. 
Interestingly, the appeals procedures 
Lake City and Clearfield were not 
outcome of the cases. Yet the 
considerable space in addressing what 
the proper process for appeals. 
Lake City turned on the question 
rights become established, while the 
in Davis County v. Clearfield City was 
of a conditional use permit was based 
facts. 
used by Salt 
critical to the 
Courts spent 
they viewed as 
Scherbel v. Salt 




The rulings have already generated considerable 
discussion. Many planners and city officials are 
concerned about having to turn over zoning 
administration decisions to their Boards of 
Adjustment The Boards in many communities are 
generally felt to have Little understanding of the 
rules of zoning and their role in administering them. 
The Utah League of Cities and Towns is currently 
polling its members, anticipating the introduction of 
legislation in the 1989 State Legislature to deal with 
the issue raised in the court rulings. 
Even two of the Utah Supreme Court Justices have 
disagreed with the change in appeals procedures. 
Justices Howe and Hall, in a concurring and dissenting 
opinion in Scherbel v. Salt Lake City, said, "The 
Planning Commission is an advisory body to the 
Council, Utah Code Ann. Par. 10-9-4 (1986), and hence 
the latter reviews actions of the Planning Commission. 
The Board of Adjustment has no statutory authority to 
review decisions of the Planning Commission. ... 
Indeed, one member of the Planning Commission sits on 
the Board of Adjustment, which would make any hearing 
of an appeal biased." 
The Utah APA Legislative Committee plans on working 
with the League of Cities and Towns to determine what 
course of action, if any, to take with the 1989 State 
Legislature on this issue. We would like to hear from 
all interested planners, attorneys, and city 
officials. Please contact Wilf Sommerkorn, 451-3278, 
Ralph Becker, 355-8816, or any member of the Utah APA 
Legislative Committee. 
The Legislative Committee will also be meeting on July 
12 at 11:00 am at 9 Exchange Place, Suite 1000, Salt 
Lake City, to discuss its program for the upcoming 
year. This issue is sure to be among them. All APA 
members interested in this and other legislative 
issues are invited to attend. D 
zssBHVESTED RIGHTS, ROLE OF PUBLIC COMMENT,! 
IDECIDED BY UTAH COURTS! 
Several important zoning issues were addressed in 
rulings handed down recently by the state's highest 
courts, including the question of when rights become 
vested, and what the role of public comment is in the 
making of zoning decisions. 
In Scherbel v. Salt Lake City, the Utah Supreme 
Court ruled that an applicant must do more than 
simply make an incomplete application to vest 
development rights. Meanwhile, the Utah Court of 
Appeals, in Davis County v. Clearfield City, said that 
public comment cannot be the only reason for approval 
or denial of a conditional use permit 
Both rulings also stated that the correct procedure 
for challenging a zoning decision of the Planning 
Commission is to submit an appeal to the Board of 
Adjustment, not the City Council (see story on page 
i ) . 
In 1979, developer Jack Scherbel applied for approval 
of a 35-unit condominium project on the southeast 
T T T i l i r%r » %.T».T-
I corner of 2nd Avenue and E Street in Salt Lake City. 
J The City Council, in an appeal from an action by the 
I Planning Commission, turned down the proposal 
I In the meantime, acting on petitions submitted by 
I Avenues area residents, the City Council had rezoned 
I the area where ScherbePs property was located from 
R-6 to R-2A. 
I Scherbel filed suit against the city, claiming, among 
J other things, that he had a vested right to continue 
J seeking development approval with R-6 densities 
I because his original application was made while the 
J property was still zoned R-6. 
J The state Supreme Court turned down the developer's 
I claim, finding that Scherbel's application "did not 
I comply with the R-6 zoning ordinance requirements then 
I in effect. His application therefore cannot serve to 
I vest any rights to a particular zoning 
J classification." 
I "Allowing persons to obtain vested rights under a 
I zoning ordinance merely by filing preliminary and 
I incomplete papers would defeat the very purpose of 
I zoning regulations," the Court said. 
I The issue of when development rights become vested is 
I handled differently in different states. Some states 
I do not allow vesting until a building permit has been 
I issued and construction has actually commenced. Prior 
I to that time, changes in ordinances would mean a 
I developer would have to modify his plans to comply 
I with the new ordinances. 
J Other states allow vesting at earlier points in the 
I development approval process. 
I Utah did not have a clear rule on vested rights until 
I this latest court decision. The state's traditionally 
I conservative climate has prompted some observers to 
I quip that a developer in Utah gains a vested right 
I when he's lying in bed at night dreaming about a new 
I project. 
I Assistant Salt Lake City Attorney Bruce Baird said 
I that prior to the Scherbel ruling, developers would 
I hear of potential zoning changes and would then "run 
I in with some preliminary sketches and claim they had 
I some vested rights for development. The court clearly 
I said," however, "they had to have some pretty final 
I plans that would have met the existing zoning prior to 
I the change." 
I The role of public comment in the making of zoning 
I decisions was a central issue addressed by the Utah 
V 
Court of Appeals in Davis County v. Clearfield City. 
In 1984, the Davis County Mental Health Department 
applied to Clearfield City for a conditional use 
permit to operate a residential treatment program for 
adolescents and adults suffering from substance abuse. 
The site was located in a commercial zone, but was 
adjacent to a residential neighborhood. 
After several meetings before the Planning Commission 
and City Council, Clearfield denied the application. 
Residents from the residential neighborhood were in 
attendance at most of the meetings, voicing strong 
opposition to the proposal. 
The trial court, in considering the reasons for denial 
of the conditional use permit, found that there was no 
evidence substantiated by facts which would have 
justified the denial. The district court judge 
concluded that the only basis he could find for the 
denial was the opposition of the neighbors. While 
indicating that there is a role for public comment in 
zoning decision-making, the judge ruled that public 
opposition alone was not an adequate reason for denial 
of the permit. 
The Appeals Court noted that "the trial court was 
correct in concluding^ that the offered reasons are 
without factual basis in the record. What the court 
found to be the real reason for the action, 'public 
clamor,' is not an adequate legal basis for the city's 
decision." 
The Appeals Court even went so far as to cite a recent 
Wyoming Supreme Court ruling on a similar issue which 
said, "'(t)he opposition of neighbors is not one of 
the considerations to be taken into account' when 
determining whether to issue a development permit." Q 
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